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A DEFINITE AND PERMANENT IDEA?
INVENTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
AND CHEMICAL SCIENCES AND THE
DETERMINATION OF CONCEPTION IN
PATENT LAW
INTRODUCTION

In the November, 1994 patent infringement appeal of Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed' that Burroughs Wellcome
Company (BW) researchers invented the method for treating Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2 with azidothymidine (AZT).' In so finding, the court ruled that an inventor completes conception of a
pharmaceutical invention when the inventor shows possession of a
definite and permanent idea of the invention, regardless of whether the inventor also held a "reasonable expectation" that the invention would work as intended.4 The Burroughs decision settles
the years-long controversy surrounding the patent rights to AZT
by permitting BW to maintain the exclusive right to sell the drug
as an AIDS therapy until the patents expire in the year 2005. 5

1. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
1994), affg in part Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1208,
1213 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
2. HlV is a retrovirus determined in 1987 to cause AIDS. Robert Gallo, The
AIDS Virus; Human Retroviruses, Part 1!, 256 Sci. AM., Jan. 1987, at 47. See generally id., passim for a background discussion of retroviruses, HIV and AIDS.
3. AZT is the common name of the drug zidovudine. Evan Ackiron, Note, Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals:The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 145
(1991). Although not a cure for either HIV or AIDS, AZT effectively slows the onset
of AIDS in an HIV-infected person and reduces the severity of infection in persons
with AIDS, thereby extending the overall life expectancy of an afflicted person.
Study Provides Additional Confirmation that AZT Improves the Survival of People
with AIDS, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 4, 1992, availablein LExis, ASAPII File.
4. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228. See infra notes 166-90 and accompanying text
for a further discussion of the Burroughs decision.
5. Wellcome Wins AZT, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1994, § B, at 2. However, the
Burroughs court remanded the case to the district court for trial on the issue of
inventorship of AZT as a method to improve a patient's immune system. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1232.
A patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling an invention for seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). See infra notes 22-
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In ruling that the BW researchers were the sole inventors of
AZT therapy, the Burroughs court applied the Mergenthaler standard of conception.' This standard defines a complete conception
as the formation of a definite and permanent idea sufficient to
allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to put the idea into
practice without the need for undue experimentation.7 However,
in the past, federal courts have recognized that when the subject
matter of the invention is unpredictable, the Mergenthaler standard may not provide an accurate determination of conception."
In such cases, some courts applied the doctrine of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice to the invention at issue.9
This doctrine states that separating conception from reduction to
practice is impossible when an inventor must perform experiments before confirming that the idea results in a successful invention. ° These two standards are mutually exclusive: an idea
that requires confirming experiments to show its feasibility cannot
exist in a definite and permanent form." The need for two legal
standards of conception reflects the fundamental differences be-

60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the U.S. patent system.
Critics accused BW of "price gouging" as soon as it began marketing AZT in
1987. David Axinn, Burroughs Wellcome Embroiled Over AZT, 239 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., May 27, 1991, at 7. When BW first introduced AZT it set the price
per patient at more than $10,000 per year. Janet Kidd Stewart, Drug Firm Here
Seeks OK for Generic AZT, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at 48. Subsequently,
BW reduced the price twice to reach a low of about $2,500 per year per patient in
1992. Id.
In 1992, a Washington, D.C. based public interest group brought suit seeking
a court's ruling that the BW patents for AZT were invalid. People with AIDS
Health Group v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., No. 91-0574, 1992 WL 18834, at *3
(D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1992). The case was dismissed in 1992. Id. The court expressly
noted the "public's concern surrounding AIDS and the availability of affordable
AZT." Id. However, the court stated that in view of the (then) pending litigation
between BW and Barr Laboratories, the interests of the parties were better served
by awaiting the result of that litigation.
6. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1227. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Mergenthaler standard of conception.
7. See Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
8. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed.
Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169
(1991). Disciplines considered by the court to be "inherently unpredictable" include
the chemical and biological sciences. Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157, 158
(C.C.P.A. 1940). In recent years, the Federal Circuit has stated that the biotechnology arts are also unpredictable. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
9. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206. See infra notes 100-90 for a discussion of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.
10. Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
11. See, e.g., id. (stating that conception is not complete if the inventor must
use trial and error to test the feasibility of an idea); Smith, 111 F.2d at 162-63
(stating that in chemistry and biology, invention conception does not exist in definite and permanent form before reduction to practice).
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tween invention in engineering-related disciplines and the empirical sciences, such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.12 Engineers typically focus on applied technology, using well-understood
scientific principles to develop new products and processes. 3 In
contrast, since the state of biomedical knowledge today is far from
well-understood, pharmaceutical scientists and biotechnologists
often conduct research and development without fully understanding the underlying biological and chemical mechanisms. 4
Therefore, even with recent advances in biotechnology, product
development in these disciplines remains largely empirical. 5
In recent years, the Federal Circuit, and other federal courts
relying on Federal Circuit precedent, indicated a willingness to
acknowledge the differences between engineering and the more
empirically-based disciplines by applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to biotechnology invention. 6 Nevertheless, in the recent case of Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Barr Laboratories,Inc., the Federal Circuit refused to extend this doctrine to a case of a pharmaceutical invention of a
new use for a known chemical compound. 17 This reluctance of
the courts to accommodate the differences in the various scientific
disciplines is not a new phenomenon since the law of patents
developed at a time when inventions primarily involved engineering-related devices and processes." While patent law today frequently addresses non-engineering-related invention, the law's
view of conception today remains largely a relic of another time,
utilizing a rule of law that has changed little since it was first
applied in 1897.19 Admittedly, application of the Mergenthaler
standard to cases of invention resulting from experiment has not
12. See, e.g., Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents-A Proposal,
51 J. PAT. OFF. SockY 768, 783 (1969) (distinguishing mechanical invention from

chemical invention); see also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(stating that an inventor cannot show conception of a new gene sequence before
producing it or possessing knowledge of its structure).
13.

N. Copp & A. ZANELLA, DISCOVERY, INNOVATION, AND RISK: CASE STUDIES

IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 5 (1993).
14. DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 32

(1977).
15. See, e.g., OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PHARMACEUTICAL R & D:
COSTS, RISKS & REWARDS 111 (1993) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL R & D].
16. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai, Inc. 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub. nom. Genetics
Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
17. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
18. William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, J.L. MED. 263, 268-69.
See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the engineering
bias in patent law.
19. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Mergenthaler standard.
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been frequent in the past.20 However, such cases are likely to
increase in the future as the American research community begins
to focus more on the development of not-yet-applied technology,
especially in the area of pharmaceutical invention.21
This Note examines the legal definition of conception as an
element of invention. Part I addresses the requirements for patent
protection under United States patent law and discusses these
requirements as a manifestation of the fundamental policy objectives of the patent system. Part II of this Note addresses invention by focusing on the two different legal standards of conception.
Part II places particular emphasis on an historical analysis of
cases applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice. Part III of this Note highlights the differences
between basic research, especially in pharmaceutical invention,
and research in the applied sciences. Part III also addresses the
failure of patent law to acknowledge these fundamental differences. Part IV discusses the current state of the law of conception
and puts forth a proposal that the Federal Circuit extend the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to
pharmaceutical invention.
I. THE STANDARDS FOR PATENTABILITY UNDER UNITED STATES

PATENT LAW
This Section addresses the requirements for patentability as
required by both the United States Constitution and the Patent
Act. This Section also discusses federal court interpretation of
these provisions. This Section then addresses the fundamental
policy objectives of the United States patent system as exhibited
in judicial interpretation of the Patent Act.
A. Statutory Requirements for Patent Protection of an Invention
The United States Constitution provides for the protection of
inventions by conferring on Congress the authority to "promote
the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries." " Congress responded to this provision by enacting the Patent Act of 1790.2 Since the inception of the Patent Act, Congress

20. See infra notes 118-46, 166-90 and accompanying text for discussion of cases
involving chemical or pharmaceutical inventions in which courts applied the

Mergenthalerstandard.
21. See infra notes 239-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the changing nature of American research and the possible increase in patent litigation resulting from these changes.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl8.
23. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). Congress implemented the
Patent Act of 1790 by using its legislative discretion in the application of the direc-
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has interpreted this Constitutional provision as authorizing the
granting of patents for new and useful inventions.2' Section 101
of the Patent Act provides that: "[wihoever invents or discovers a
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."25 Therefore, to qualify for patent protection an invention
must. consist of patentable subject matter and satisfy the further
limitations of the Patent Act.26
1. PatentableSubject Matter
An invention cannot qualify for patent protection unless it
embodies subject matter covered under the Patent Act. 27 Although neither the Constitution nor the Patent Act define patentable subject matter, courts have traditionally interpreted § 101 to
allow patent protection for only those inventions relating to applied technology.2" Thus, courts have held that "laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas [are] not patentable."'
Moreover, even though an invention embodies potentially
patentable subject matter, the invention must exist in complete
enough form for immediate application without substantial moditives of the Framers. Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
Accordingly, Congress set forth various conditions for patentability and created the
forerunner to the current Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) as the administrative means by which to implement the Constitutional provision. Id.
24. Tallman I. Nguti, Patent Law: Doctrinal Stability-A Research and Development Definition of Invention is Key, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 653, 667 (1986).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The further requirements of novelty, utility, and
unobviousness are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (1988). For a discussion of
these requirements, see infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text. The 1952 Patent
Act is codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-276 (1988).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
27. Id.
28. Rebecca Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science, 97 YALE
L.J. 177, 185-86 (1987). The Constitution uses the words "useful Arts" and "Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Although the Constitution does not expressly
mention the word "invention," analysis indicates that the Framers appreciated the
differences between basic scientific ideas and inventions embodying applied technology. Nguti, supra note 24, at 666.
29. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). The Court elaborated on
the requirements for patentability of subject matter by stating:
[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is
not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc'; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
Such discoveries are "manifestations of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.
Id. (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)).
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fication or experimentation.'0 By requiring an inventor to specifically define the parameters of the invention, the Patent Act
forecloses patent protection for inventions that are not sufficiently
"ripe."3 ' An invention rises to the level of patentable subject matter only when the inventor shows either through his own experimentation or through analysis of existing technology that the
invention relates to an applied discipline. 2
2. Novelty, Utility, and Unobviousness
In addition to the requirement that an invention consist of
patentable subject matter, an invention must be novel, useful, and
unobvious in order to qualify for patent protection.3 The novelty
provision requires that an invention not be previously patented,
described in published literature anywhere in the world, or in use
or on sale in the United States prior to the date of invention by
the applicant.3 4 An invention also fails to exhibit novelty under
the Patent Act if another person has filed a patent application on
the same invention in the United States.35 By requiring novelty
in invention, United States patent law assures that a patent does
not remove from unrestricted use knowledge that was previously
freely available to society, merely because a person was the first
to file a patent application."
An inventor must also set forth the utility of an invention.37
The utility requirement guarantees that an inventor obtains a
patent for only that technology sufficiently well defined to allow
description of a specific use." Utility usually becomes an issue

30. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 186. Professor Eisenberg states that this requirement follows from 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 186.
See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for discussion of § 101 and § 112.
31. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 185-86. When an inventor cannot show the
application of an idea, the invention more likely embodies unpatentable basic research. Id. In essence, the inventor seeking a patent under these circumstances is
sent back to the laboratory to pursue further work. Id.
32. Id.
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
34. § 102(a), (b).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). In the United States, a patent application remains secret
until the patent issues. Charles R.B. Macedo, The Firstto File System: Is American
Adoption of the InternationalStandard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 193, 205 (1990). If it does not issue, the invention is not disclosed. Id. In many foreign countries, the filing of a patent application results in
disclosure of the invention to the public whether or not the patent is granted. Id.
36. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149-50 (1989).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
38. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). The utility requirement
serves three purposes: a useful invention will actually benefit society by providing
a previously unavailable product or process; the disclosure of a beneficial new use
stimulates other inventors to improve on the patented invention, thus further in-
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only in chemical or biological inventions. 9 Since the intended
use of a mechanical or electro-mechanical invention is usually
apparent from the drawing or description contained within the
patent disclosure, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the
courts rarely question the utility of these inventions.40 However,
patents based on the chemical arts, such as pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology invention, must demonstrate a specific utility.41
Lastly, for an invention to satisfy the statutory requirements
for patentability, an inventor must show that the invention is not
obvious.42 An invention is not patentable, even though it satisfies
all other requirements, if the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art43 is such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would find the invention obvious." This precludes patent protection for those inventions embodying trivial improvements in existing technology that do not
add significantly to the body of scientific knowledge.45
3. Disclosure Requirement
Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that an inventor who
seeks a patent set forth the invention in sufficient detail "to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out the invention."46 Setting forth the invention in detail serves two purposes.4 7 First, full disclosure assures that the
public obtains the full benefit of the invention at the end of the
patent term by providing the knowledge necessary to put the
invention into practice." Second, disclosure provides the PTO
with the information necessary to determine whether the inven-

creasing the technology available to society; and, patenting of an invention that is
not sufficiently well-defined to allow the identification of a specific use could result
in a monopoly for a broad field of scientific knowledge. Id. at 533-35.
39. Noonan, supra note 18, at 266.

40. Id.
41. Id. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that a chemical invention must
show more than a usefulness in scientific research before the granting of a patent
for the invention. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
43. The term "prior art" denotes existing knowledge, literature references, patents, or known uses of the invention that antedate the invention at issue. Mooney
v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 1981).
44. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966). Although not existing by
statute before the 1952 Patent Act, the addition of the unobviousness requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 103 codified more than one hundred years of case law. Id. at 14-15.

45. Id.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
47. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 207-08.

48. Id.
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tion is, in fact, an operative and useful invention.49
B. Statutory Patent Requirements as a Reflection of Fundamental
Policy Objectives
As Section A discussed, an idea must jump through several
statutory "hoops" before qualifying for patent protection. These
stringent requirements serve to effectuate the fundamental purpose of the United States patent system-to promote innovations
in science and technology.5" To motivate inventors to disclose
innovations to the public, Congress set forth a period during
which an inventor holds exclusive rights to an invention.r' While
not exactly a monopoly, patent protection does result in a government-sanctioned period during which limited competition
occurs. 2 Since the period of patent exclusivity conflicts with the
American tradition of free and open access to ideas, only substantial improvements in the body of scientific and technical knowledge are considered worthy of patent protection.' In the absence
of patent protection, all ideas in the public domain inure for the
good of society.5'
When an inventor procures a patent, the public obtains access to the invention through the description contained in the
patent."5 Although the inventor retains exclusive rights to the
invention for seventeen years, the public also receives substantial
benefit by obtaining access to the description of the invention."
This disclosure of the invention increases the base of knowledge
available in society by motivating further innovation which results when other inventors use the patent as a springboard to

develop more technologically advanced ideas.57

49. Id.
50. Nguti, supra note 24, at 667.

51. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). The Patent Act provides
the patentee with a seventeen year "right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention throughout the United States. .

. ." 35

U.S.C. § 154.

52. Graham, 383 U.S. at 7. Graham sets forth a synopsis of the 1790 Patent Act
and later judicial interpretations. Id. at 5-14. Of note is the integral part Thomas
Jefferson played in the history of U.S. patent law as the first administrator of the
patent system and as the author of the 1793 Patent Act. Id. at 7. His views on
inventorship and the need for scientific progress were instrumental in the formulation of United States patent policy. Id.
53. Id. at 8-9. The Graham Court traces the American aversion to exclusive
intellectual property rights to the practice of the English Crown to award property
rights to court favorites in goods that previously belonged in the public domain, as
well as the British monopoly on tea that partially instigated the Revolutionary
War. Id. at 6-7.
54. Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Universal Foundry, 402 U.S. 313, 345 (1971).
55. Macedo, supra note 35, at 205.
56. Nguti, aupra note 24, at 658.
57. Id.

19951

The Determinationof Conception in Patent Law

The United States patent system effectuates the dissemination of knowledge throughout society by providing economic incentives to the inventor in return for disclosure of the invention.M
As such, the patent system effectively promotes innovation in
American industry."9 Moreover, research intensive industries,
such as pharmaceuticals, consider patent protection indispensable
to promoting research into new and useful products and processes. 6

II. DETERMINATION OF INVENTORSHIP
Regardless of whether an invention satisfies all requirements
for patentability, one may still not qualify for a patent if the party
did not actually invent the subject matter of the patent.6 1 Since
patents reward inventors for disclosing beneficial technology to
the public, a person cannot reap the reward of exclusive rights to
an invention without being the true inventor. 2 Perhaps to reiterate the importance of this requirement, the Patent Act twice
states that the person seeking patent protection must personally
invent the subject matter of the invention.'
This Section discusses the requirements that allow a person
to qualify for status as an inventor. First, this Section defines
invention for the purposes of patent law. Next, this Section summarizes the requirement that an inventor reduce the invention to
practice before qualifying for status as an inventor. The following
two Sections provide a detailed analysis of conception by discussing the two legal standards applied to determine conception, with
particular focus on an historical analysis of cases addressing the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.

58. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, § 1.05

(1994).
59. Id.; see generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertaintyand the Standardof Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 4-9 (1992) (addressing and dismissing arguments that
the patent system does not promote innovation); Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 19596 (stating that the possibility of patent protection motivates research in biotechnology).
60. Merges, supra note 59, at 6; See also George deStevens, A Chemist's View,
62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 653, 657 (1965) (stating that the patent system motivates
research that results in beneficial pharmaceutical products).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
62. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1869).
63. SCHLICHER, supra note 58, at § 1.07. Section 102(f) of the Patent Act expressly states that a person will lose patent rights if "he did not himself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented." 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). Whereas, § 101 states by
implication that a person must invent the subject matter with use of the words
"whoever invents or discovers... may obtain a patent thereof...." 35 U.S.C. §
101.
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A. Definition of Invention
An inventor is one who invents." In non-patent terms, a
person invents when thinking up, devising, or fabricating something in the mind.65 However, to qualify for status as an inventor for the purposes of patent law, a person must do more than
mentally formulate an abstract idea with a desirable result." In
legal terms, invention requires both a conception of the idea and
reduction to practice." Conception looks to the subjective mental
state of the inventor; it is the "full and complete mental act of
formulating the invention to be claimed."' Reduction to practice
pertains to the objective nature of the inventive act; that is,
whether the inventor proved that the idea worked as anticipated.6 Since familiarity with reduction to practice is necessary for
an understanding of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and
reduction to practice, this Section first addresses reduction to
practice.
B. Reduction to Practice
Reduction to practice consists of the "physical act of producing the desired results by the means conceived by the inventor."0 Reduction to practice can be either actual or constructive.71 An actual reduction to practice occurs when the inventor
tests the idea and shows that it works for its intended purpose.72

64. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 965 (2d ed. 1983).
65. Id.
66. Poyle v. Uhl, 328 F.2d 893, 897-88 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
67. Rex-Chainbelt, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 477 F.2d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1973)
(stating that "it requires no citation of authority to state that invention has not
occurred until the subject of the invention has been both conceived and reduced to
practice.").
68. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 802 (S.D. Tex.),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). See infra notes 78-190 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the legal standards of conception.
69. Newkirk v. Lulejan, 825 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
70. Boyce v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Corona Tire
Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383 (1928)); see also Rohm & Haas, 557
F. Supp. at 803 (stating that reduction to practice requires the making of the product accompanied by sufficient testing and experimentation to demonstrate the
utility of the invention).
71. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
72. Rohm & Haas, 557 F. Supp. at 803. The nature of testing required varies
with the type of invention, but, generally, more complex inventions require more
detailed testing showing the feasibility of the idea. Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058,
1061 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, reduction to practice need only show that an idea
will probably work, not that it exists in a form ready for commercial application.
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Constructive reduction to practice results when the inventor files
a patent application." Provided the application meets the disclosure requirements of § 112 of the Patent Act, the PTO does not
require the inventor to show actual reduction to practice.7 4
Reduction to practice is a question of law determined by
examination of the relevant evidence." -A court determines actual reduction to practice by analyzing the evidence to determine
whether the inventor actually formulated the idea into a working
model or performed experiments showing the feasibility of the
idea.76 When determining whether an inventor actually reduced
an idea to practice, courts review the record in its entirety and
apply a rule of reason in assessing the adequacy of the evidence.77
C. Conception
Although an inventor must show both conception and reduction to practice of the invention, conception operates as a threshold issue in determining inventorship.7" Unless a person participates in the conception of the invention, one does not qualify as
an inventor.7" This remains true even if the party is the only
participant in the reduction to practice. 0
Courts have described conception as a "pivotal if somewhat
nebulous notion in patent law.""1 In order to establish that one,
in fact, fully conceived the invention, the inventor must show
evidence of subjective mental state at the time of formation of the

Id.
73. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1376. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the disclosure requirement.

74. Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d 856, 866 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
75. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Philco Corp., 201 F. Supp. 135, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1961),

affd, 309 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1962).
76. See, e.g., Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1377-78, (using a "reasoned examination,
analysis, and evaluation of [the] pertinent evidence" to determine whether claimed
inventors reduced the claimed invention to practice); Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d
1368, 1373-74 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (analyzing presented evidence for third party corrob-

oration of inventor's reduction to practice); Mikus v. Watchel, 542 F.2d 1157, 116162 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (requiring sufficient evidence showing that others read and

understood experimentation to mean an actual reduction to practice); Fredkin v.
Irasek, 397 F.2d 342, 347-48 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968) (examin-

ing presented evidence for adequate proof of inventor's claimed reduction to practice).
77. Mikus, 542 F.2d at 1378.
78. In re Hardee, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1123 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1984) (citing Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Technitrol, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d. 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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idea.8 2 Moreover, since inventive thought occurs only in the mind
of the party asserting inventorship, the would-be inventor must
also present independent corroborating evidence that supports the
claim of conception.' Like reduction to practice, courts determine conception as a question of law by analyzing the presented
evidence." However, since determination of a person's state of
mind is inherently more difficult than application of an objective
standard, establishing conception is not as clear-cut as reduction
to practice." In assessing whether an inventor's subjective mental formulation of an idea rose to the level of conception, courts
traditionally apply the Mergenthalerstandard of conception.
1. The Mergenthaler Standard: Conception Consists of a Definite
and Permanent Idea
5 defined
The landmark case of Mergenthaler v. Scudder"
conception as follows:

The conception of an invention consists in the complete performance
of the mental part of the inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished in order to perfect the act or instruments belongs to the
department of construction, not invention. It is therefore the forma-

tion in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of
the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be ap-

plied in practice that constitutes an available conception within the
meaning of the patent law.8"
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)" adopted this
standard for use in interference and infringement cases 9 as ear-

82. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
83. AMP, Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics, 853 F. Supp. 808, 821 (M.D. Pa.
1994). The corroboration requirement assures that an inventor does not misrepresent the facts surrounding the alleged conception in the quest for a patent. Id.
84. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
85. See generally Intermedics, Inc. v. Sweeney, 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (stating that disposing of issues involving an inventor's state of mind in
patent infringement suit difficult to show in motion for summary judgment) affd,
991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993); United States v. Scarpa, 701 F. Supp. 379, 382
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that objective standards are preferable to subjective standards because of potential difficulty, or possible "futility," of satisfactorily determining subjective states of mind) affd, 991 F.2d. 63 (2d Cir. 1990).
86. Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897).
87. Id. Professor Chisum traces the history of this standard to two 1871 decisions by a Commissioner of Patents, as well as an 1890 treatise on patent law. 3
DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY
AND INFRINGEMENT § 10.0411 (1994).

88. The CCPA was the predecessor court to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Donald W. Banner, The Creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Resulting Revitalization of the Patent System, 50 ALB. L. REv. 585 (1986).
89. 3 CHISUM, supra note 87, at § 10.04. An interference proceeding arises when
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ly as 1929.9 The CCPA later modified the Mergenthaler standard to require that the definite and permanent idea exist in a
sufficiently complete form to allow one skilled in the art to put the
idea into practice without the need for further inventive skill."
Under the Mergenthaler standard, a party claiming
inventorship must show not only a perception of the desired result, but also how to practice the invention.92 If the inventor
must utilize further inventive skill to show the feasibility of the
idea, it did not rise to the level of definite and permanent. 93
Moreover, if the inventor seemingly conceives an invention, but
later finds that extensive research is necessary before achieving
successful results, conception did not result.9 Instead, the mental form of the idea at the time of claimed conception "was a mere
hope or expectation, a statement of the problem, but not an inventive conception."' However, the need for further experimentation does not operate as an absolute bar to a claim of earlier
conception if the subsequent work required no more than routine
skill.9'
two or more parties claim invention of the same subject matter. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 562 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991). This proceeding determines priority of invention between two or more patent applications or between at least one patent applicant and one or more parties previously awarded patents. Id. A patent infringement action results when a patentee brings a suit alleging that at least one other
party used, made and/or sold the subject matter of a valid patent belonging to the
plaintiff. Id. at 538.
90. Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
91. Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 387 (C.C.P.A. 1946).
92. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Technitrol,
Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (defining the date of conception as the date when "the inventive idea.., becomes so clearly defined in the
mind of the inventor as to be capable of being converted to reality and reduced to
practice by the inventor or one skilled in the art"); Meitzner v. Corte, 410 F.2d.
433, 437 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (stating that conception does not occur unless the inventor
possesses the means to reduce the idea to practice).
93. Bac v. Loomis, 252 F.2d 571, 577 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (holding that the need for
an extensive program of experimentation and design of parts before manifestation
of an operative invention negates a claim of earlier conception); see also Gunter v.
Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 79-80 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (ruling that an inventor establishes
conception when he discloses the idea to another to an extent that the second party
could "reduce the idea to practical form without the exercise of inventive faculty");
Jacobs v. Sohl, 280 F.2d 140, 143-44 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (holding that an idea does not
rise to the level of definite and permanent if the inventor is still searching for a
material needed to make the invention).
94. Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Bourne v. Jones,
114 F. Supp. 413, 418 (S.D. Fla. 1951) (stating that "[i]nvention cannot be predicated on mere speculation or conjecture; it must be based on something ascertained, something definite and certain"), affd, 207 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953).
95. Alpert, 305 F.2d at 894.
96. Bell Tel. Lab. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 422 F. Supp. 372, 379 (D. Del. 1976),
affd, 564 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); see also Mattor
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Courts have applied the Mergenthaler standard either expressly or by implication in dozens of cases since its original
enunciation in 1897." 7 The consistent application of the
Mergenthaler standard makes it clear that the patent system
rewards the person who possesses both the mental formulation of
the idea and the means to apply the idea to practical use.98 More
simply,
the patent system rewards "the doer and not the dream"
er. 99

2. Doctrine of Simultaneous Conception and Reduction to
Practice: Conception When an Inventor Cannot Form a Definite
and Permanent Idea Without Experimentation
In his seminal 1890 treatise on patent law, Professor William
Robinson recognized that in some instances conception of an invention cannot be separated from reduction to practice.
stated:

°0

He

In many inventions the act of conception is clearly distinct, in point
of time, from that of reduction [and the definite and permanent idea
standard can be applied].... In many others the work of conception
and reduction goes forward almost simultaneously, so nearly that
no date can be fixed as that before which the conception was complete and after which the reduction to practice was begun. This is
true in nearly all inventions which are the result of experiment, where the inventor, instead of evolving the entire art or instrument
out of his own thought, conjectures that such an act or substance
will subserve a given purpose, and having tried it, finds that it
accomplishes the end ...

at no instant before the experiment suc-

ceeds can it be said that the conception of the invention exists in
the inventor's mind ...

the first to bring the art or instrument into

successful operation is the first conceiver of the entire inven101
tion.

v. Coolegem, 530 F.2d 1391, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that a work of a technician carrying out the oral instructions of the inventor did not negate claim of prior
conception); Hobbs v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n., 451 F.2d 849, 865
(5th Cir. 1971) (holding that a person may use the services of others to complete an
invention without losing a right to a patent).
97. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 87, at § 10.04 nn.8-9 for a comprehensive listing
of cases applying the Mergenthaler standard to both interference and infringement
cases.
98. Compare Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (stating
Mergenthaler established law for defining conception) with Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (applying
Mergenthaleras enunciated in an earlier case).
99. John 0. Tresansky, Inventorship Determination, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 551,
557 (1974).
100. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 381
(1890).
101. Id.
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The CCPA did not expressly apply this view of conception
until the 1940 interference case of Smith v. Bousquet.1°2 In
Smith, two inventors formed independent hypotheses that a group
of chemical compounds might exhibit insecticidal activity. 10 3
However, neither scientist could predict the effectiveness of the
compounds on specific insects unless he actually performed experiments."° ' The Smith court stated that in the "unpredictable"
fields of biology and chemistry, conception and reduction to practice are inseparable.1"5 In such cases, conception does not occur
until the inventor successfully completes experiments showing the
feasibility of the idea, and, as a result, conception and reduction
to practice occur simultaneously.0 6 Prior to this time, the idea
remains "mere speculation or possibly a probable deduction from
facts0 already
known" but not conceived for the purposes of patent
7
law.

Although the Smith court provided the opportunity for federal courts to apply the doctrine of simultaneous conception and
reduction to practice to cases involving chemical and biological
inventions, the CCPA did not again expressly recognize the standard until the 1962 case of Alpert v. Slatin.l Alpert was also
an interference case where two independent inventors claimed
invention of the same chemical process.0 9 One of the inventors
attempted to show an earlier date of conception with evidence
that he suggested a research program to investigate the idea prior
to the other inventor's awarded date of invention."0 The Alpert
court ruled this proof insufficient to show conception because
extensive experimentation was later required to secure a successful reduction to practice."' The Alpert court stated that the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice should
be applied in those "unusual" and "rare" cases when the inventor
does not know whether the idea will successfully result without

102. Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157, 162-63 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
103. Id. at 159.
104. Id. The court acknowledged that in 1934 there existed no known correlation
between insecticidal activity and chemical structure. Id.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962). But c.f Bourne v. Jones,
114 F. Supp. 413, 418 (S.D. Fla. 1951) (equating the development of a new plant
variety with the invention of a chemical compound, thus requiring application of
the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice as stated in
Smith), affd, 207 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953).
109. Alpert, 305 F.2d at 892.
110. Id. at 894.
111. Id. Six months was required to obtain a clearly successful reduction to
practice of the idea. Id.
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first obtaining empirical information from actual attempts to
reduce the idea to practice." 2 In such cases, the inventor cannot
possess a complete mental realization of the invention before
experimentation."'
In 1964, the CCPA again applied the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to an invention resulting from experiment." 4 In an appeal from a Patent Office rejection of a patent for the invention of the element Americium, In re
Seaborg,"5 the reduction to practice took about one month and,
until its completion, the inventor possessed no knowledge that the

experiments would actually produce the element."' As such, the
Seaborg court stated that the invention required application of the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to
determine the date of conception." 7
Examination of the above cases illustrates that by 1964 the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice was
evolving into an established alternative to the Mergenthaler standard of conception. Nevertheless, several months after the
Seaborg decision, the CCPA significantly limited the application of

this doctrine." 8 In Applegate v. Scherer, two parties claimed
inventorship of a chemical method to control marine pests. 1 9
Like the insecticide invention in Smith v. Bousquet, neither party

112. Id. The Alpert court cited the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice as enunciated by Professor Robinson and as applied in Smith v.
Bousquet. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01 and a discussion of Professor
Robinson's view of the doctrine and supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Smith court's view of the doctrine.
113. Alpert, 305 F.2d at 894.
114. In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
115. 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The PTO rejected the patent application because it believed the element was inherently produced during the operation of a
previously patented nuclear reactor. Id. As such, the PTO ruled the invention unpatentable over the prior art. Id. at 997.
116. Id. at 997, 999. To produce about six billionths of a gram of the element
Americium, the inventor bombarded the element plutonium with deuterons or
neutrons at high power for approximately one hundred days in a nuclear reactor.
Id. at 996.
117. Id. at 999. The court expressly cited the doctrine of simultaneous conception
and reduction to practice as applied in Smith v. Bousquet. Id. See supra notes 10207 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
118. Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
119. Id. at 571. Inventor Applegate discovered a chemical to combat the pest, but
the compound could not be adapted for field use. Id. at 571-72. Scherer was an
employee of a German chemical company who, after reading an article describing
the Applegate group's research in a trade publication, contacted Applegate to suggest use of a related compound. Id. Inventor Scherer learned of this discovery and
informed inventor Applegate that a related chemical compound might show similar
efficacy. Id. Applegate used the chemical compound as directed by Scherer and
found it highly effective. Id. at 572. Both parties filed patent applications on the invention and an interference was declared. Id.
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in Applegate possessed knowledge that the chemical compound
would actually show effectiveness as a pesticide prior to actual
reduction to practice. 20 Thus, the Applegate court should have
applied the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice to the determination of conception.12 Nonetheless, the
Applegate court applied the Mergenthaler standard to the invention, ruling that inventor Scherer possessed a complete conception
of the invention before disclosing it to inventor Applegate, even
though Scherer did not test his idea.' 22 The court distinguished
the case from Smith v. Bousquet by stating that the previous case
involved independent inventors, while Applegate centered on the
issue of whether one inventor derived the invention from anoth23
er.1
The Applegate court's view that Scherer possessed a complete
conception of the chemical invention before he reduced his idea to
practice contradicted previous CCPA holdings dictating application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice in cases of chemical invention resulting from experiment. 24 However, an examination of the court's reasoning sheds
light on the apparent inconsistency. The issue in Applegate involved originality of the invention, thus requiring a determination
of whether Applegate derived the invention from Scherer.' 25
Derivation results when one party communicates a complete conception to another who then reduces the idea to practice, usually
only using routine skill.12' Thus, by definition, derivation cannot
exist when an idea requires reduction to practice before a complete conception results.'2 7 As such, the Applegate court could
not apply the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to

120. Id. at 572-73.
121. See Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Smith v. Bousquet,
111 F.2d 157, 162-63 (C.C.P.A. 1940). See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying

text for a discussion of these cases.
122. Applegate, 332 F.2d at 573-74.

123. Id. at 573.
124. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of previous
cases applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.
125. Applegate, 332 F.2d at 572-73. An originality case involves the "who" of invention. Id. at 573 n.1. In contrast, a priority action determines the times when
two independent parties completed the inventive act. Id. at 573. Although both
center on the issue of inventorship and are resolved in an interference proceeding,
they are distinct concepts in patent law. Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
126. Hedgewick v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Derivation may be

either intentional or innocent. Applegate, 332 F.2d at 573 n.1. However, regardless
of the means one acquires the invention, one cannot obtain status as an inventor if
he derived the invention from another. See 35 U.S.C § 102(f) (1988).
127. See generally 2 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §
10.01(5) (2d ed. 1994) (providing a summary of derivation law).
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practice without also ruling that Applegate did not derive the
invention from Scherer. 12' Notably, the Applegate court gave only a perfunctory analysis to the issue of conception, stating only
that Scherer's disclosure to Applegate showed a completed conception prior to the actual testing of the invention. 129 In so ruling,
the court failed to reconcile its decision with earlier cases holding
that, in analogous inventions, conception occurs simultaneously
with reduction to practice 3 ' The court's focus on the parties,
rather than the nature of the invention, resulted in a substantial
limiting of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction
to practice by foreclosing its application in originality cases.' 3 '
The CCPA followed the Applegate holding in the 1970 interference case of MacMillan v. Moffett.'32 In this case, scientist
Moffett submitted a large number of chemical compounds to scientist MacMillan.133 The court ruled that Moffett completely conceived the invention prior to MacMillan's testing, even though he
did not specifically realize that only one of the many compounds
would exhibit effectiveness.'
The court rebuffed MacMillan's
attempt at invoking the doctrine of simultaneous conception and
reduction to practice as applied in Smith v. Bousquet by stating
that the Applegate decision made it "abundantly clear that such a
doctrine does not apply in cases where the issue is originality or
derivation."'3 5 As in Applegate, the court did not give a detailed
analysis to the issue of conception, instead focusing on the parties
rather than the nature of the invention.'36 In separate findings,
the MacMillan court also held that a conceiving party need not

128. See generally id. (detailing proper analysis of derivation). A contrary decision would have resulted in the court's awarding the invention to Applegate, even
though he exercised no inventive skill. Applegate, 332 F.2d at 573.
129. Applegate, 332 F.2d at 573. The court cited an earlier case applying the
Mergenthalerstandard to the conception of a mechanical invention. Id. at 572-73.
130. See, e.g., id. at 573. The court distinguished the case from Smith v.
Bousquet stating that the previous case involved independent inventors, while
Applegate centered on the issue of whether one inventor derived the invention from
another. Id. Thus, the court's refusal to follow precedent centered on the form of
the invention, rather than the substance.
131. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of a later
case relying on the Applegate holding to find the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice does not apply in cases of originality.
132. MacMillan v. Moffett, 432 F.2d 1237, 1240 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
133. Id. at 1238. The court noted that both scientists were "recognized experts"
in their respective fields. Id.
134. Id. at 1239-40.
135. Id. Moreover, the MacMillan court also expressed doubt that the Smith
decision was based on such a doctrine, although the court did not explain the rationale for its view. Id. at 1240. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Smith.
136. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale of the Applegate decision.
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"appreciate" the special properties of the invention to show a complete conception187 and that an inventor can show a complete
conception of one compound submitted for screening with many
other compounds.138
In a later interference case not involving originality, the
CCPA again restricted application of the doctrine of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice.' 39 In the interference case
of Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, two chemists claimed invention of a
drug compound. 4" However, the chemists could not establish
the pharmaceutical effectiveness of the compound without successful experimentation on' animals.1 ' The opposing party attempted to show that inventor Englehardt did not fully conceive the

137. MacMillan, 432 F.2d at 1239. The MacMillan court termed the antiperspirant activity of the chemical compound as an "unexpected propert[y]." Id. at
1239. However, the record indicates that the invention involved a method to control perspiration with the chemical compound. Id. at 1237. It thus appears that the
properties of the invention termed by the court as "unexpected" actually constituted the substance of the invention. Therefore, the MacMillan court essentially held
that one does not need to recognize the substantive properties of an invention to
obtain a patent. This result does not mesh with the requirement under the
Mergenthalerstandard that an inventor possess a definite and permanent idea of
his invention to show a complete conception. See Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 387
(C.C.P.A. 1946). See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Mergenthalerstandard.
138. MacMillan, 432 F.2d at 1239-40. Moffett submitted 69 compounds for
screening, but only one compound showed anti-perspirant efficacy. Id. at 1238-39.
The court stated that Moffett "thought specifically about 69 different compounds ... and of a use for each in a method for controlling perspiration." Id. at
1239. The MacMillan court found the inventor's rationale for including the specific
compound irrelevant to showing a complete conception of the invention. Id. Again,
this reasoning conflicts with the Mergenthaler standard which requires that an
inventor clearly delineate the parameters of his invention to show conception. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that to establish
conception a party must "show possession of every feature recited in the count, and
that every limitation ... must have been known to the inventor at the time of the
alleged conception."). See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Mergenthaler standard.
139. Rey.Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
140. 493 F.2d 1380, 1385-86 (C.C.P.A. 1974). The chemist Rey-Bellet synthesized
a chemical compound similar in structure to a well-known anti-depressant. Id. at
1382. The claimed date of Englehardt's invention occurred after Rey-Bellet synthesized the compound, but before he ran extensive testing showing the efficacy of the
compound as an anti-depressant. Id. at 1385.
141. Id. at 1387. In pharmaceutical invention, structural similarity to a compound of known activity often does not indicate the medicinal activity of another
compound. As such, an inventor often cannot predict pharmacological activity, if
any, without extensive testing. Noonan, supra note 18; see also Harry Goldsmith,
PharmaceuticalInvention, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 648, 649 (1965) (stating that out
of hundreds of thousands of compounds synthesized by chemists for use as potential new drug products, only about one in 8,500 passes the stringent tests required
before a new drug product reaches the consumer). See infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of invention in the pharmaceutical sciences.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 28:687

invention until obtaining the confirming test results. 14 2 The ReyBellet court rejected this argument by stating that the need for
extensive testing did not preclude a finding that Englehardt
formed a complete conception at the time he synthesized the compound and recognized its possible anti-depressant effects. 4 3 In
effect, the Rey-Bellet court held that a complete conception results
when an inventor initially recognizes the potential effectiveness of
a pharmaceutical invention. 44 The amount of testing needed to
prove the actual effectiveness of a compound does not influence
the completeness of a claimed conception, if the tests are routinely
performed in the discipline. 45 Moreover, the Rey-Bellet court also questioned whether the Alpert v. Slatin decision actually applied the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice but did not state the rationale for this view. 4 "
Taken together, the Applegate, MacMillan and Rey-Bellet
decisions markedly limited the application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to chemical and
pharmaceutical inventions. An examination of cases addressing
the issue of conception between 1974 and 1988 reveals only one
instance where a federal court applied the doctrine in a case of
chemical invention. 147 Moreover, some doubt was also expressed

142. Rey-Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1386-87. The opposing party specifically attempted
to invoke the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice as
applied in Alpert v. Slatin. Id. He stated that the extensive testing needed to show
the efficacy of the chemical compound as an anti-depressant was analogous to the
"perplexing intricate difficulties" cited by the Alpert court as requiring application
of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice. Id. See supra
notes 108-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Alpert.
143. Rey-Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1387. As such, the Rey-Bellet court focused on the
nature of the testing required to show the feasibility of an idea, rather than the
amount. Id.
144. Id. at 1386-87.
145. Id. at 1387. This ruling modified the holding of the Alpert court by substituting the amount of testing required to show viability of an idea for the nature of
the testing. See Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962). See supra
notes 108-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Alpert.
146. Rey-Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1387. The court's statement was, of course, dicta.
However, the dearth of cases applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and
reduction to practice after this decision is notable. See infra note 147 for a discussion of the one case applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction
to practice between 1974 and 1991.
147. See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 408 (D.
Del. 1980), affd, 664 F.2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1981). StandardOil involved the invention
of a new structural form of an existing polymer. Id. at 374. At the time of the invention, polymer chemists did not know whether the form desired could be synthesized. Id. The court expressly applied the doctrine of simultaneous conception
and reduction to practice as enunciated by Professor Robinson and Alpert v. Slatin.
Id. at 407-08. The court did not cite either Applegate or Rey-Bellet. Id.; cf Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 802-04 (S.D. Tex. 1983) , rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556
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questioning the existence of the doctrine of simultaneous conception as a standard of conception separate from the Mergenthaler
standard.' 4
Nevertheless, in a 1988 chemical interference case the Federal Circuit again recognized the existence of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.14 9 In Oka v.
Youssefyeh, the Federal Circuit cited cases applying the doctrine
to rule that conception of a chemical compound requires an idea of
the chemical structure and possession of the means for making
the compound.150 While stopping short of adopting a view that
equated conception with reduction to practice, the Oka court's
acknowledgment provided the opportunity for subsequent application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice. 5'
The Federal Circuit responded to the lead of the Oka court by
applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice in the 1991 patent infringement case of Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.'5 2 One of the alleged infringing par-

(Fed. Cir. 1983) (applying Applegate and Rey.Bellet to hold that conception of an
herbicide completed before testing showing specific effectiveness), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 851 (1984); GAF Corp. v. Amchem Prod., 514 F. Supp. 943, 968 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (applying Applegate to hold that a party submitting chemicals for screening
does not qualify as an inventor unless he possesses a conception that a result
should or could occur).
148. 3 CHISUM, supra note 87, at § 10.04(5). Professor Chisum argues that the
Rey-Bellet decision shows that the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice is not a doctrine at all, but is actually an application of the
Mergenthalerstandard. Id. He reasons that the Rey-Bellet court's emphasis on the
routine nature of experiments capable of performance by one of ordinary skill in
the art, no matter how extensive, shows a classic example of reduction to practice.
Id. Thus, conception of a chemical invention can be completed even before necessary extensive testing to the satisfaction of the Mergenthaler standard. Id. However, this analysis ignores subsequent application of the doctrine of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice discussed infra at notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
149. Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 584 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
150. Id. at 583. The court cited Alpert and Standard Oil, two chemical cases
applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice. Id.
Interestingly, the court also cited a chemical case applying the Mergenthalerstandard in its holding that the party did not conceive the invention (Coleman v. Dines,
754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Id.
151. Id. at 584 n.1. The Oka court did not address application of the doctrine of
simultaneous conception and reduction to practice because neither party argued
that the conception of a chemical compound equated conception with reduction to
practice. Id. However, the court stated that if the parties had raised the issue they
would be required to show the utility of the compound as well. Id.
152. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991). The
Amgen court cited the "well-established* rule of chemical invention as stated in
Oka v. Youssefyeh. Id.
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ties claimed that its researcher was the first to conceive a method
to produce a gene sequence useful as a therapeutic agent. 5 ' Although the gene occurred naturally, at the time of the research
scientists could not accurately determine its structure. 154 Moreover, Amgen researchers did not determine the exact structure
until after successfully cloning the gene.'55 The Amgen court
ruled that in such a case conception of a new gene sequence does
not occur until the inventor isolates the gene.' In other words,
conception of a gene occurs simultaneously with reduction to practice.1 7 The court further noted that description of a chemical
compound by its principal biological property does not constitute
conception, but only a "wish to know the identity of any material
with that biological property.' 5
The Federal Circuit subsequently strengthened the Amgen
holding in the 1993 interference case of Fiers v. Revel. 59 The
Fiers court reiterated that conception of a biologically active gene
sequence does not occur until the inventor successfully isolates the
gene and further added that the ease of preparation of the gene
does not negate the requirement for actual reduction to practice."8 Mere description of the gene by its hoped-for biological
activity is insufficient to show conception, even though the method
used will almost certainly produce the gene.' 61 The Fiers court
noted that to hold otherwise would conflict with the stated policy
of the patent statute, which requires disclosure of inventions, not

153. Id. at 1205-06. Although the Genetics Institute (the allegedly infringing
company) did not isolate the gene until after the Amgen scientist, Genetics Institute attempted to show the inventor's prior conception, coupled with his diligence
in reducing the idea to practice, invalidated Amgen's prior date of invention. Id.
Section 102(g) of the Patent Act provides that a party who conceives prior to another, but reduces to practice after the second party's date of invention (conception
and reduction to practice), is entitled to a patent if the first conceiver exercised
diligence in reducing the idea to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988), In 1981, the
Genetics Institute researcher designed a method that would theoretically result in
successful isolation of the gene. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205-06. Although the research
did eventually lead to a method to obtain the gene, the Genetics Institute scientist
did not complete his work until after the Amgen work was completed. Id.
154. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.

155. Id.
156. Id.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
160. Id. The inventor attempted to distinguish Fiers from Amgen by showing
that the method subsequently used to isolate the gene was less sophisticated than
that used in Amgen. Id. As such, he argued that Amgen should have been limited
to its facts and that only a difficult-to-isolate gene should require a showing of both
conception and reduction to practice. Id. The court refused to accept this argument.

Id.
161. Id.
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research plans."6 2 Interestingly, this holding seems to contradict
the Rey-Bellet ruling that an inventor may complete conception of
a biologically active gene sequence if the6 tests required to show
efficacy are straightforward and routine.
Although Fiers applied the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice in a case of routine reduction to
practice, the Federal Circuit did not overrule the holding of ReyBellet. However, the decision certainly called into question whether Rey-Bellet remained a viable statement of the law of chemical
and pharmaceutical invention. Moreover, even though the Federal
Circuit did not address a case involving both the originality and
the conception of a chemical or pharmaceutical invention, a 1994
district court case questioned whether the Federal Circuit would
adhere to the Applegate holding in a more modem case of invention. ' At the very least, it appeared that cases calling for application of the doctrine were no longer "rare" or "unusual."6 5
Nonetheless, in the November, 1994 infringement case of
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the Federal
Circuit refused to completely revitalize the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.'66 In Burroughs,
National Institutes of Health (NIH) scientists assisted BW scientists in determining the effectiveness of AZT as a therapy for HIV
and AIDS.6 7 Notably, at the time of the invention, NIH scien162. Id. at 1169.
163. See Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
164. See Brown v. University of Cal., 866 F. Supp 439, 444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
appeal dismissed, remanded by Brown v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 36761 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 1994) (reviewing the law of conception in the federal courts and concluding that if faced with the question, the Federal Circuit
would overrule Applegate and MacMillan); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Synbiotics Corp., 849 F. Supp. 740, 742 (S.D. Cal. 1994), appeal dismissed, remanded sub nom. Brown v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36761 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 21, 1994) (casting doubt on the validity of the Applegate holding by applying the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice in a case of
originality). Both of these cases were likely remanded based on the result of the
Burroughs decision discussed infra at notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
165. See Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
166. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
167. Id. at 1225. NIH scientist Dr. Samuel Broder solicited several pharmaceutical companies for samples of chemical compounds with potential for activity
against the virus. Id. BW then conducted initial screening experiments using nonhuman retroviruses that showed AZT's effectiveness against these viruses. Id. In
February 1985, BW sent Broder a coded sample of AZT, along with approximately
50 other compounds for testing on human HIV. Brian O'Reilly, The Inside Story of
the AIDS Drug, FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at 112, 120. Before receiving confirmation
of the positive results of the test, BW prepared a draft patent application for filing
in the United Kingdom. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1225. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Broder
informed BW of AZTs effectiveness against human HIV and at this time BW revealed the identity of the compound to him as AZT. Id. In subsequent months, Dr.
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tists were the only researchers in the world who could perform
tests utilizing human HIV.' However, the patents granted to
BW for the invention of AZT therapy listed only the BW scientists
as inventors.'6 9 In a later suit for infringement of the AZT patents, the defendant pharmaceutical companies alleged that the
patent did not name all inventors of AZT therapy.170 As such,
the defendants contended that BW's failure to list all inventors
rendered the patents invalid or subject to correction of
inventorship, thereby allowing the defendants to sell AZT without
infringing the claims of any valid patents. 7 ' The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, instead applying the Mergenthaler
standard of conception to rule that BW scientists formed a complete conception of the invention before the NIH scientists performed the tests showing the efficacy of AZT in humans.'72 In

Broder and another NIH scientist conducted a human clinical trial that showed
that AZT could increase the immune system strength of a person with HIV. Id.
168. Gallo, supra note 2, at 50. NIH scientists later obtained a patent for their
method to maintain viable human HIV in the laboratory for the purpose of testing
potential AIDS therapies. U.S. Patent No. 4,704,357, "Immortalized T-Lymphocyte
Cell Line for Testing HLTV-III Inactivation," issued November 3, 1987.
169. Burroughs, 40 F.3d. at 1225. BW holds six patents covering methods and
formulations of using AZT to treat humans afflicted with HIV: (1) U.S. Patent No.
4,724,232, issued Feb. 9, 1988; (2) U.S. Patent No. 4,828,130, issued May 9, 1989;
(3) U.S. Patent No. 4,833,130, issued May 23, 1989; (4) U.S. Patent No. 4,837,208,
issued June 6, 1989; (5) U.S. Patent No. 4,818,538, issued Apr. 4, 1989; and (6)
U.S. Patent No. 4,818,750, issued Apr. 4, 1989. Burroughs,40 F.3d. at 1225 n.2.
170. Id. at 1226-27. Specifically, defendants Barr and Novopharm contended that
BW researchers did not completely conceive the invention of AZT until NIH scientists performed testing showing the efficacy of the drug against human HIV. Id. at
1227. The lawsuit commenced when the defendants individually applied to the
Food and Drug Administration for permission to manufacture and sell a generic
form of AZT. Id. at 1226. BW then instituted actions for patent infringement
against each company. Id. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law
in favor of BW after three weeks of trial, ruling that BW fully conceived the invention before submitting it to NIH scientists for testing. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D.N.C. 1993) rev'd in part by Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
171. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1227. The Patent Act sets forth the procedure for correction of inventorship. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1988). Although the choice of remedy is
discretionary, courts rarely invalidate an issued patent on the basis of incorrect
inventorship, instead requiring correction of inventorship as permitted in § 256 of
the Patent Act. Lucy Gamon, Note, Patent Law in the Context of Corporate Research, 8 J. CORP. L. 497, 517 (1983). Courts will not invalidate an issued patent
lightly because it holds a presumption of validity. Id.
172. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1231. However, the Burroughs court remanded the
case on the issue of whether NIH scientists sufficiently contributed to the invention of AZT as a method to improve the immune system of a human afflicted with
HIV to require joint inventorship. Id. at 1232. The court found the record at the
district court level insufficient to justify judgment as a matter of law that BW scientists fully conceived the invention before the assistance given by the NIH scientists in designing and conducting human clinical trials. Id. at 1231-32.
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reaching its decision, the court stated that "an inventor need not
know that his invention will work" in order for conception to exist
in definite and permanent form."' While the Burroughs court
acknowledged that in some cases an inventor cannot show conception until a successful reduction to practice, in such cases conception fails because it is incomplete, not because the particular field
of the invention exhibits inherent unpredictability. 174 In the
court's view, reduction to practice serves a corroborative function,
showing that the inventor did not actually possess a definite and
permanent idea of an invention. 175
Under the reasoning of the Burroughs decision, an idea otherwise considered definite and permanent can fail to constitute a
complete conception if subsequent experimentation, especially
experimental failure, shows that the supposed conception was not,
in fact, certain.1 76 However, the Burroughs court's view of reduction to practice as a corroboration of conception does not correspond to the established view of invention that considers conception as a process separate from reduction to practice.177 Under
the Mergenthaler standard, conception operates distinctly from
reduction to practice; that is, an idea either exists in definite and
permanent form or it does not.1 7' However, while seemingly ap-

173. Id. The Burroughs court followed the reasoning of MacMillan to hold that
an inventor need not possess a "reasonable expectation" that an invention will
work as expected. MacMillan v. Moffett, 432 F.2d 1237, 1239 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See
supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of MacMillan.
174. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1229. In reaching this conclusion, the Burroughs
court re-examined the facts of Smith v. Bousquet to determine that the decision in
that case resulted not from the nature of the invention, but from the failure of either party to show a complete conception prior to reduction to practice. Id. at 122829. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith.
175. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1229.
176. Id. Although he agreed with the result of the case, Judge Lourie declined to
join the majority's reasoning with respect to the interaction between conception
and reduction to practice. Id. at 1233 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). He cautioned
the court not to confuse concepts and stated that the completeness of conception
must be determined independently of the reduction to practice. Id. He also expressed the view that a conception still remains complete even though it may never culminate in a successful reduction to practice. Id.
177. See 2 ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at § 10.01 (stating that the inventive
process consists of two necessary steps, conception and reduction to practice); see,
e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988) (requiring the consideration of both conception and
reduction to practice in determining priority of invention); Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (implying an
individual analysis of conception and reduction to practice), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
947 (1987).
178. See, e.g., Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (ruling that
conception not complete when an inventor possesses an idea for a desired result
but not the means for effectively carrying out the idea); Meitzner v. Corte, 410
F.2d 433, 437 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that conception not complete when an inventor recognizes that an idea could work but not the manner in which an idea
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plying the Mergenthaler standard to the invention of AZT, the
Burroughs court did not actually determine the existence of a
definite and permanent idea "as it is thereafter to be reduced to
practice."179 Rather, the court reasoned that BW scientists
formed a definite and permanent idea of the invention because it
was later applied in practice.' Although the distinction is subtle, it is crucial, because the law does not recognize a nunc pro
tunc conception.'' Thus, the Burroughs court's attempt to fit
the facts surrounding the invention of AZT into the confines of the
Mergenthaler standard resulted in a decision that is incongruous
with the established law of conception. Contrary to the view of the
Burroughs court, the subject matter of the invention may very
well influence the issue of conception."8 2
Unlike the Burroughs court, the Amgen and Fiers courts did
recognize that some inventions are inherently unpredictable."s
While these decisions signaled a possible resurgence of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice in the
law of conception in chemical and pharmaceutical invention, the
Burroughs court expressly declined to extend the doctrine outside
of the field of gene invention. 4 The court distinguished Amgen
and Fiers from Burroughs on the ground that the former cases
involved a new invention of a compound of previously unknown
structure, while Burroughs centered on the invention of a new use
for a known compound.'85 However, this distinction is arbitrary-in either case, conception prior to reduction to practice can
amount to nothing more than a description of the invention by "its
hoped for biological activity."' The Burroughs court attempted

will work).
179. Technitrol, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
180. See, e.g., Burroughs,40 F.3d at 1230. The Burroughs court expressly stated
that since the NIH testing of AZT using human HIV confirmed the operability of
the invention, the BW scientists showed complete conception. Id.
181. See Spero v. Ringold, 377 F.2d 652, 659 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that nunc
pro tunc conception neither exists nor would it be recognized); see, e.g., Langer v.
Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915, 929 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (citing the rule that conception and
reduction to practice cannot be established nunc pro tunc).
182. Cf In re Ross, 305 F.2d 878, 883-84 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (Smith, J., dissenting in
part) (cautioning that ,inventions in highly technical fields, such as
pharmaceuticals, may not fit into the neat categories of invention existing in patent law). See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
manner in which different scientific disciplines conduct research.
183. See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
decisions.
184. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1229.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that
an inventor does not complete conception of a biologically active gene sequence
until the completion of successful reduction to practice); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that conception does
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to avoid justifying such a conclusion by reasoning that the BW
scientists showed complete conception because they "thoroughly
and particularly set out the inventions as they would later be
used.""" However, such detailed description does not negate the
fact that BW claimed the invention of AZT therapy for use in
humans without fully knowing that the invention would exhibit
effectiveness in humans."
Therefore, such documentation
amounted to nothing more than a definite and permanent hope
that AZT would show effectiveness in humans." 9 Granting of a
patent under such circumstances conflicts with the policy of patent law: "to promote the disclosure of inventions, not of research
plans."19
III. CHEMICAL AND BIOCHEMICAL INVENTION AS INHERENTLY
DIFFERENT FROM ENGINEERING-RELATED INVENTION

The Federal Circuit's decision in Burroughs not to extend the
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to
cases involving non-biochemical pharmaceutical invention reflects
a continuation of the reluctance of federal courts to address the
substantive differences of the inventive process in experimentalbased sciences. These disciplines function in an inherently different manner from engineering-related invention and thus often do
not fit into a body of patent law created to address mechanical
and electrical invention.1 9' This Section focuses on these differences by distinguishing the invention process in experimentalnot result when an inventor merely describes an invention by its primary biological
property) cert. denied sub nom. Genetic Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 69
(1991).
187. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1231.
188. See, e.g., id. at 1225-26 (describing the events surrounding the invention of
AZT).
189. See, e.g., Fiers,984 F.2d at 1169 (stating that disclosure of method to obtain
a gene sequence shows only a disclosure of a "research plan"). Interestingly, the
Burroughs court found the predictiveness of the in vitro non-human retrovirus
tests used by BW to screen AZT irrelevant to the issue of conception. Id. However,
in a case involving a therapy for AIDS utilizing previously known compounds, the
Board of Patent Appeals rejected a patent application based on the lack of predictiveness of in vitro tests to show efficacy in humans as of the time of the invention
(1987). Ex parte Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1892, 1897 (Bd. Pat. App. 1991). Id.
A commentator believes that this decision requires an inventor to show more than
in vitro testing in order to obtain a patent for a pharmaceutical invention involving
a new use for a known compound. B. P. O'Shaughnessy, PatentableSubject Matter,
in THE LAW AND STRATEGY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTs 72 (K. D. Sibley ed.,
1994).
190. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169; see, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535
(1966) (stating that a patent is not a reward for the search, but compensation for
its successful conclusion).
191. See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the engineering bias present in patent law.
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based disciplines, especially pharmaceuticals, from that of the
engineering-oriented fields. Moreover, this Section discusses the
traditional failure of patent law in addressing these differences.
Additionally, this Section suggests that the changing nature of
American research will result in increased litigation resulting
from attempts to patent experimental based inventions that might
not yet be sufficiently "ripe."
A. Inherent Differences Between the Experimental Sciences and
Engineering
As noted previously, in his landmark 1890 treatise on patent
law, Professor William Robinson recognized that some inventions
require confirmation through experimentation before completion of
the inventive process.19 2 This view was an early acknowledgment of the inherent differences between the experimental sciences and the more "applied" sciences, such as mechanical engineering. The functional differences between the experimental sciences
and 1applied
technology is now well recognized outside of patent
93
law.

Fundamentally, scientists and engineers work in very different manners."" Scientists generally focus their work on the collection of knowledge, often with no goal of eventual practical
application. 95 Since scientists aim their work toward an understanding of previously unknown or misunderstood theories of
nature, a scientist frequently holds no rational expectation of the
viability of a hypothesis until the completion of experimentation. 9 6 Instead, the scientist uses empirical methodology to discern general patterns which can then be developed into predictive
models. 97 Moreover, the scientist's research frequently culminates in a published article, rather than a finished product."'9
192. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 100, § 381.
193. See, e.g., CoPp & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5 (describing the difference
between scientists and engineers); see also Thomas J. Allen, Distinguishing Engineers from Scientists, in MANAGING PROFESSIONALS IN CREATIVE ORGANIZATIONS: A
COLLECTION OF READINGS 3 (Ralph Katz ed., 1988) (stating that vast differences
exist between scientists and engineers); JOHN D. KEMPER, THE ENGINEER AND HIS
PROFESSION 90 (3d ed. 1982) (stating that scientists produce "knowledge," while
engineers produce "things").
194. COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5; see also KEMPER supra note 193, at
90-91.
195. COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5. Such research is generally referred to
as "basic research." See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 7.
196. See generally ROBERT TEITELMAN, PROFITS OF SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN
MARRIAGE OF BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY 8 (1994) [hereinafter PROFITS OF SCIENCE] (stating that "empiricism rules" in the experimental sciences).
197. COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5.
198. KEMPER, supra note 193, at 91; see also Allen, supra note 193, at 8. Dissemination of scientific knowledge through the published article effectuates the goal of
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In contrast, an engineer focuses on the practical application
of technology.199 An engineer generally engages in the design of
tools and systems for use by mankind; more simply, an engineer
produces "things." °° Accordingly, the goals of engineering focus
primarily to the practical application of scientific principles rather
than a desire to gain knowledge for knowledge's sake.0 1
Nonetheless, it should not be construed that engineers act
merely as technicians. On the contrary, since scientific knowledge
forms the foundation for all engineering principles, engineers
must necessarily understand and utilize the theories developed by
scientists.2 2 Basic science and engineering thus operate in an
interactive manner which has been described as "cross-fertilization."20 3 That is, engineers do not just passively accept the theories developed by their scientist counterparts; instead, information
gathered in engineering research and development frequently
leads 4to a greater understanding of the underlying scientific theo2
ries. 0
Basic research in the various scientific disciplines does not
lend itself equally to applied technology. The degree to which
engineers can develop new products or processes depends largely
on the maturity of the relevant scientific discipline. 20 5 For example, the scientific theories underlying physics have been well understood for many decades and, as such, engineers working in
these areas can more predictably develop products and processes. 20 6 In contrast, in some scientific disciplines well-defined

scientists to contribute to the shared body of knowledge. Eisenberg, supra note 28,
at 184-85. As such, scientists view the published article as the necessary means by
which to gain recognition and to gauge productivity in the scientific community. Id.
199. COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5; see also, KEMPER, supra note 193, at

90.
200. KEMPER, supra note 193, at 90; see also, COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at
5 (describing engineers as concerned with the development of "better machines,

structures, systems, chemicals or processes").
201. See S. C. FLORMAN, THE EXISTENTIAL PLEASURES OF ENGINEERING 178 (2d
ed. 1994) (stating that engineers focus on utility, rather than on understanding
basic scientific principles); COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that engineers utilize a different point of scientific inquiry from that of scientists).
202. See, e.g., COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 5 (describing the interaction
between basic science and engineering).
203. Id. at 7-8.
204. Id.
205. See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 32; see also PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra
note 196, at 198 (implying that predictability of new product development exists as
a function of the maturity of the underlying scientific principle).
206. See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 32 (stating that theoretical physics
was sufficiently mature in the 1930s to allow scientists to develop the atomic bomb
in a relatively short time); see also COPP & ZANELLA, supra note 13, at 8 (describing the development of the Apollo Project in the 1960s as utilizing well understood
scientific principles); PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 198 (discussing the
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knowledge of the underlying scientific principles does not yet exist.2" 7 In these fields, both basic research and product development progress in a largely empirical manner."' This trial and
error approach necessarily makes the development of applied
technology in these fields less predictable than in more mature
fields.2" 9 Pharmaceutical research presents a classic example of
a discipline which places substantial emphasis on such empirical
methodology.2 1 °
C. The Unpredictable Nature of PharmaceuticalResearch
Nowhere has the gap between basic scientific knowledge and
applied technology been more evident than in the relationship
between the biological sciences and pharmaceutical research.211
Traditionally, basic biological research led to few advances in
medicinal products because scientists knew little about the underlying relationship between biological mechanisms and drug
therapy.212 Drug research thus was an "intricate and complex
process, differing in important ways from other forms of scientific
research."2 13 The field progressed in a largely empirical fashion,
relying heavily on experimentation and observation.214 Moreover, drug research generally focused more on developing effective

development of the transistor as resulting from the use of well-understood principles of physics).
207. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 198 (stating that biotechnology not
yet sufficiently mature to allow predicable development of drugs and diagnostic
methods); see also SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 32 (stating that pharmaceutical research operates on the "borderline of the unknown").
208. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 48.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 32; see also ROBERT TEITELMAN, GENE DREAMS: WALL STREET, ACADEMIA, AND THE RISE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 15 (1989) [hereinafter GENE DREAMS].
211. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 156-57.
212. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 32; see also PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra
note 196, at 156-57. Even important inroads into basic biological phenomena, such
as the discovery of DNA in 1953, initially failed to result in pharmaceutical discovery because the gap between basic science and applied technology was too wide. Id.
Additionally, research into biological processes generally took place in academic or
government laboratory settings thus affording little opportunity for technology
transfer to pharmaceutical companies. Id. at 156-57.
213. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 29. This differs from product development
in the engineering-related disciplines, where the underlying scientific principles
are usually better understood. Id. at 32. See supra notes 192-210 and accompanying text for discussion of the differences between engineering and basic scientific
research.
214. See id. Schwartzman describes the traditional method of drug discovery as
an ongoing series of hypothesis generation and experimentation. Id. The researcher
refines the original hypothesis based on the results of the experiments. Id. As a
result, drug discovery consists of many "false starts" which make the process exceptionally labor intensive and expensive. Id.
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chemical compounds, rather than on an understanding of the
underlying disease-causing biological mechanisms.215 Consequently, pharmaceutical companies acted as large-scale chemical
screening houses-producing successful pharmaceutical products
not because they understood how drugs worked in biological systems, but because they developed effective screening programs
that allowed them to test hundreds of thousands of chemical compounds a year.2 16 Discovery did not occur predictably; rather, it
resulted from these highly structured, albeit scientifically sophisticated, mechanical screening programs and, often, mere luck.2 17
Understandably unhappy with the unpredictable nature of
pharmaceutical research, by the 1980s major pharmaceutical
companies had begun to branch out into the area of rational drug
research. Rational drug development attempts to relate chemical
structure with biological activity. 2 8 Rational research methods
became possible because the discipline of biotechnology had progressed to the point where scientists could begin implementing its

215. GENE DREAMS, supra note 210, at 15. Large pharmaceutical companies did

perform basic biological research. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 31. However,
the approach focused more on applied research, using the results of work with
chemical entities on biological systems to develop new theories on which to base
further experimentation. Id. at 34. In contrast, academic institutions and government laboratories performed more fundamental biomedical research, focusing on
the biological mechanisms themselves. GENE DREAMS, supra note 210, at 15.
216. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 156-57; see also SCHWARTZMAN,
supra note 14, at 48. Under this methodology, only one out of ten thousand chemical compounds tested successfully reach the market. E. Whittaker & D. J. Walker,
A Shift to External Alliances for ProductDevelopment in the PharmaceuticalIndustry, R & D MGMT. 249, 250 (1994).
217. See GENE DREAMS, supra note 210, at 15 (describing traditional drug research as "an attempt to organize and rationalize serendipity.") This is not to say
that drug research stemmed from irrationality, however the rationale of drug development did not emanate from a knowledge of the manner in which chemical
compound interacted with a biological system. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note
196, at 165. While not clearly understanding basic biological processes, pharmaceutical companies utilized advances in chemistry to synthesize new chemical compounds on a continual basis. Id. This enabled them to effectuate small changes in
chemical compounds which would hopefully lead to large differences in therapeutic
effects. Id.
218. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 177. Rational drug research endeavors to identify and eradicate disease causing mechanisms in biological systems by
utilizing the functional aspects of chemical compounds to attack the disease without harming necessary cellular function. Deborah Erickson, Rational Drugs; Transforming Drug Research from an Art into a Science, 262 SCI. AM., Jan. 1990, at 102.
In essence, a scientist works "backwards," first identifying a disease and then attempting to modify it. PHARMACEUTICAL R & D, supra note 15, at 108-09. This
approach differs from the traditional mass screening approach to pharmaceutical
research in which drug discovery focused primarily on screening chemicals to serve
desired functions. Id. The growth of rational drug development has been aided by
the continuously increasing power of computers that allow sophisticated modeling
and the automation of previously labor intensive laboratory techniques. Id. at 132.
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theories into applied drug research.219 The growth of biotechnology allowed scientists to genetically modify molecules to provide
more effective biotherapeutic compounds." 2 However, since universities historically conducted most of the biotechnology research,
pharmaceutical companies found it necessary to form joint partnerships with academic scientists.2 21 As such, the lines between
industrial research and development and academic research became blurred because scientists who formerly conducted primarily
basic research now began to direct their work toward the development22 2of new and commercially viable drug products and processes.
Although experts initially predicted that the marriage of
molecular biology and drug research would result in rapid discovery of new and useful pharmaceutical products, biotherapeutic
research did not progress as quickly as expected.22 Neverthe-

219. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 180-81. Molecular biology relates to

the study of the structural and functional aspects of DNA and RNA, as well as the
analysis of the structure of proteins. Id. at 183. More abstractly, molecular biology

is a "discipline exploring the most fundamental order of biological reality." Id. Molecular biology discovery provided insights into the underlying workings of the
biological systems. See Erickson, supra note 218, at 102. Thus, by understanding
the biological functions at the cellular level, researchers could match biological
function with a corresponding chemical process and block or modify a reaction
which caused a diseased state in the body. Id.; see generally Dan L. Burk, Introduction: A Biotechnology Primer,55 U. PITT. L. REV. 611, 612-13 (1994). Burk provides
a basic description of molecular biology for the non-biotechnologist. Id.
220. Burk, supra note 219, at 621. The term "biotechnology" refers to the practical application of molecular biology to manipulate the biological processes of cells.
Id. at 614. Early biotechnology aimed at synthesizing naturally occurring proteins.
Id. Biotherapeutics are the "second wave" of biotechnology research. Id. at 622.
Scientists bioengineer molecules to alter or block cellular functions. Id. In so doing,
scientists can make new and more effective drug therapies, not possible with existing and known chemical compounds. Erickson, supra note 218, at 102.
221. Burk, supra note 219, at 629. Most early research into molecular biology
took place primarily at universities. PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 184.
As an academic discipline, the field grew rapidly as a result of vast government
funding and by the 1970s had become a mature area of university research. Id. at
184-85. Even while universities explored the vast potential of biotechnology, few
corporations developed expertise in biotechnology. David E. Korn, Patent and
Trade Secret Protection in University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 197 (1987). When the commercial possibilities
became evident, corporations were forced to utilize the skills of university researchers by forming joint research programs with academia. Id.
222. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 196. The basic techniques resulting from commercial development of biotechnology are: cell culture, hybridoma culture, recombinant DNA, antisense and DNA amplification techniques. Burk, supra note 219, at
614. Today, biotechnology shows extensive application in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as in agriculture, materials science, bioremediation
and natural resource operations. Id. at 621.
223. GENE DREAMS, supra note 210, at 7. Biotechnology research failed to yield
consistently predictable models; thus, today, drug development still remains some-
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less, research did result in several new medicinal treatments.22
Today, the field remains an active area of pharmaceutical research.225
D. Conflicts Between Patent Law and the Experimental Sciences
Even though marked improvements in pharmaceutical research resulted from the advent of rational drug development,
drug discovery today remains largely a matter of scientific "guesswork."226 This unpredictability has frequently resulted in uncertainty when companies seek to patent new pharmaceutical products. 7 This is not a new problem; practitioners have long recognized that the PTO fails to accommodate the differences between
chemical and biological inventions and mechanical inventions.s
This inconsistency has been traced to the evolution of United
States patent law. 229 Most early patents pertained to mechanical
devices." 0 Consequently, judicial interpretation of the patent
statutes, and the language of the statutes themselves, adapted to

what unpredictable, just as in traditional pharmaceutical research. PROFITS OF
SCIENCE,

supra note 196, at 198.

224. See generally Michael A. Sanzo, Patenting Biotherapeutics, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 387, 387 (1991) (noting four drugs emerging from biotechnology research:
insulin, human growth hormone, alpha-interferon, and tissue plasminogen activator).
225. See Reshaping Things to Come, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1994, at 65, 66.
226. Erickson, supra note 218, at 102; see also PHARMACEUTICAL R & D, supra
note 15, at 111. Drug research today remains largely qualitative. Id. Recent advances in biotechnology have failed to yield predictable methods to generate new
drugs. Id. Interestingly, the drug discovery progress is slowed somewhat by the
ever increasing wealth of medical knowledge gained from biotechnology itself. Id.
at 133. That is, as scientists discover more about biological mechanisms, the possible routes of investigation become increasingly more complex. Id. As such, groundbreaking biotechnology advances can frequently provide more questions than answers. Id.
227. See generally Sanzo, supra note 224, at 391-405 (discussing legal difficulties
resulting from attempts to patent pharmaceuticals emanating from biotechnology
research).
228. See Noonan, supra note 18, at 263, 268-69; see also Eggert, supra note 12, at
783; E. THOMAS, CHEMICAL INVENTIONS AND CHEMICAL PATENTS 8 (M. A. Auslander ed., 1964) (distinguishing mechanical invention from chemical invention).
229. Noonan, supra note 18, at 263, 268-69; see also Eggert, supra note 12, at
783. Noonan hypothesizes that the different treatment of chemical and biological
inventions stems from attempts to prevent patenting of "quack" medicinal products
at the turn of the century. Noonan, supra note 18, at 266-67. In order to curb attempts to patent these products, the courts began to require that inventors show
the usefulness of their inventions. Id. at 266. Today, inventors are still required to
show specific utility of their pharmaceutical inventions, while inventors of mechanical devices usually need not show utility. Id. at 276. See supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the utility requirement.
230. Noonan, supra note 18, at 263, 268-69; see also Eggert, supra note 12, at
783.
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best suit mechanical and, later, electronic invention. 23 1 However,
when chemical and biological invention became more prevalent,
the existing law proved ill-suited to handle the special requirement of these types of invention.23 2 Some courts attempted to
modify the existing law to fit chemical and biological invention,
however, these changes were largely ineffectual. 23 Accordingly,
the law of chemical patents has been referred to as a "child (or
orphan) of the mechanical patent law." 4
Failure to treat invention in the experimental science differently than engineering-related invention indicates that the federal
courts cannot, or will not, recognize the inherent differences between the methodologies used in the disciplines. Admittedly, the
Federal Circuit recently recognized that the unpredictable nature
of new gene invention requires application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to conception of a
new gene. 235 Nevertheless, in the later case of Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories,Inc., the Federal Circuit failed
to extend the doctrine to a pharmaceutical invention of a new
pharmaceutical use for a known chemical compound.236 Thus,
the Federal Circuit has not reinstated the previously held view
that inventions resulting from empirical research, as a general
rule, require application of a standard of conception tailored to
meet the specific needs of these disciplines."? As such, the rule
of law currently governing pharmaceutical invention fails to recog-

231. Eggert, supra note 12, at 783; see also Noonan, supra note 18, at 263, 26869.
232. Noonan, supra note 18, at 263, 268-69. For example, in the early days of
pharmaceutical invention, the Patent Office absolutely refused to issue a patent for
a chemical compound if the chemical structure appeared anywhere in the published literature. Id. at 281. This reflected the view of mechanical invention that if
a drawing existed, an invention was unpatentable over the prior art. Id. Of course,
this view ignored the fact that a mere drawing of a chemical structure did not
necessarily mean that one could actually synthesize the compound. Id. Although
prior art limitations are no longer this strict, the example remains as an illustration of the difficulty of attempting to fit chemical invention into the fixed confines
of a body of law developed for mechanical invention. Id. at 283-84.
233. Id. at 269.
234. Eggert, supra note 12, at 783.
235. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991); see
also Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of these
decisions, see supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
236. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
237. See, e.g., Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (holding that
conception and reduction to practice occur simultaneously when an invention requires experimentation to show feasibility); Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157, 158
(C.C.P.A. 1940) (stating that chemical and biological inventions require application
of separate standard of conception because of their unpredictability).
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nize what otherwise exists as a well recognized principal: that
drug discovery is an unpredictable process differing markedly
from other invention.238
E. Change in the Nature of American Research
Traditionally, the United States government provided much
of the support for basic science by funding university research or
by performing research at government laboratories. 9 The United States government directed a large portion of this funding
toward biomedical research which was in turn utilized by pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs 4 Yet, in recent years,
government funding of basic research has decreased markedly.241 Similarly, American corporations are also cutting funding
of knowledge-driven research in favor of product-oriented applied
research. 2

238. See Schwartzman, supra note 14, at 29; see also PHARMACEUTICAL R & D,
supra note 15, at 111 (stating that recent technological advances in drug developments are "far from providing a cookbook to produce new drugs."). See supra notes
211-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the empirical nature of pharmaceutical research.
239. Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, PrivatizingPublic Research, 271 SCI. AM.,
Sept. 1994, at 72, 74.
240. See PHARMACEUTICAL R & D, supra note 15, at 201-02. In 1990, the federal
government accounted for 45% of health-related research and development. Id. at
203. Over 25% of pharmaceutical products and processes developed by drug companies between 1975 and 1985 would have taken much more time to develop without
government funded academic research. Id. at 201. Biomedical research performed
at government laboratories has also resulted in technological advances utilized by
pharmaceutical companies. Id. at 202. Moreover, the United States government
also provides direct subsidies to the drug companies to encourage the development
of new drug therapies which do not have large commercial markets. Id. These socalled "orphan drugs" would probably not be developed without substantial government subsidies because of low potential sales. Id.
241. Id. at 75. In 1988, the federal government provided 61% of university research funding; by 1993 the figure decreased to 56%. Id. Moreover, the role of
government laboratories in research and development has steadily decreased since
World War II from a high of 28% in 1945 to about 11% of total basic research in
1988. James V. Lacy et al., Technology Transfer Law Governing Federally Funded
Research and Development, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1991).
242. John Markoff, Corporate Lag in Research Funds is Causing Worry, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, § A, at 1. See generally Elizabeth Corcoran, Rethinking Research: Bell Labs Seeks New Model for Industrial Research, 265 SCI. AM., Dec.
1991, at 136, 136-38 (citing AT&T as an example of an American corporation cutting basic research programs in favor of product-directed programs offering faster
return on investment); Jon Van, Applied Versus Basic Research: the Debate Escalates, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1993, § 4, at 1 (noting that few United States corporations allow scientists to explore basic science, even while recognizing its importance).
It should be noted that while basic research accounts for about one-half of
total research and development spending in the United States, corporations typically dedicate only 6% of their research and development budgets to basic research.
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The across-the-board decrease in basic research is causing
changes in the way American organizations perform scientific
research, particularly in the manner in which pharmaceutical
research is conducted. Starting in the late 1970s, pharmaceutical
companies began seeking collaborative ventures with universities
in an effort to increase the productivity of research and development.2" Universities welcomed such alliances with industry
because government support of basic academic research began to
decline. 2 " As a result of these joint research programs, the
amount of basic research performed by universities continues to
decrease because corporations generally focus their research efforts on product-driven technology. 245 Additionally, government
laboratories that previously performed basic research for public
use are facing closure as funding decreases. 2" In an effort to remain open, these laboratories increasingly seek joint research projects with industry to work on largely commercially motivated research. 47
The trend away from the funding of basic research will continue into the 1990s. 248 This will thus necessitate that universities and government laboratories continue seeking greater funding

Cohen & Noll, supra note 239, at 75. However, in some industries, spending on
basic research reached historical levels of 10%. Markoff, supra at 1. Pharmaceutical manufacturers historically tended to perform more basic research than other
science-related industries. See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 14, at 30.
243. PHARMACEUTICAL R & D, supra note 15, at 207. This increase can be traced
to the pharmaceutical industry's need for the biotechnology expertise which existed
primarily at academic laboratories. Id.
244. See, e.g., Lita Nelsen, Identifying, Evaluating, and ReportingInnovative Re-

search Developments at the University, in

UNDERSTANDING BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW:
PROTECTION, LICENSING, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES 25, 28 (Gale R.

Peterson ed., 1993) (noting that universities are pursuing industrial support because government research funds are increasingly difficult to obtain).
245. See, e.g., Cohen & Noll, supra note 239, at 75 (implying that the amount of
basic research at universities has decreased because of the greater involvement of
corporate sponsorship); see also PHARMACEUTICAL R & D, supra note 15, at 201
(stating that a private industrial firm will not extensively support basic research
because such support may not lead to a certain return on investment).
246. Cohen & Noll, supra note 239, at 73.
247. Id. The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 permits government laboratories to enter into agreements with private industry to perform joint research
projects. Lacy et al., supra note 241, at 18.
248. See, e.g., Roland W. Schmitt, Beyond Competitiveness: Technology Policy for
the 1990's, 5:1 STAN. L. & POL'v REV. 119, 120 (1993) (citing statistics showing
industrial spending on research will decrease through 1993). Moreover, the Clinton
Administration expressed a policy to further cut spending for basic research in
favor of a focus on applied technology. Id. at 124. As a result, former major government sources of basic science funding, such as the National Institutes of Health,
now direct substantial support to applied science, at the expense of basic research.
Victor F. Weisskopf, Endangered Support for Basic Science, 270 SCI. AM., May
1994, at 128.
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from industry. The foreseeable result of these collaborations will
be an even greater emphasis on applied technology because the
primary purpose of corporate sponsorship is to develop new products.

49

Moreover, a corporate sponsor will seek to lessen the

needed capital investment by choosing projects with a greater
potential for success and a shorter development timeline. s0
Such projects will almost certainly focus on applied technology.211 This is especially true in the area of pharmaceutical research because research collaborations can result in financially
lucrative commercial products.252 Moreover, as pharmaceutical
companies begin to tackle more complex disease mechanisms, they
will increasingly find it necessary to look outside of their corporations for innovative ideas."'
The pharmaceutical industry also increasingly participates in
joint research programs with specialized biotechnology firms.25 4
In these arrangements, a pharmaceutical company collaborates
with a biotechnology company to develop novel technology into
commercial pharmaceutical products. 55 These companies generally possess new technology garnered from universities. 56 Moreover, the technologies generally are at an early stage of development, requiring a large investment of capital to develop into viable commercial products. 7 Starting with the biotechnology "rev249. See generally Nelsen, supra note 244, at 25 (implying that the ultimate objective of university-industry relationships is to develop products); Van, supra note
242, at 1 (describing a Massachusetts Institute of Technology joint program with
industry in which graduate students work directly with industrial sponsors to
develop new products without performing basic research). Focus on applied technology makes complete sense from the standpoint of a corporation since applied
research produces short-term results much more frequently. Daniel E. Koshland,
Jr., Basic Research; Government Policy; Part 1; Editorial,259 SCI. 291, 291 (Jan.
15, 1993). Koshland states: "[i]n-applied research the successful application is expected; in basic research a successful application is astonishing." Id.
250. See generally Nelsen, supra note 244, at 25 (stating that the newer and the
more basic the technology, the higher the risk that development will not result in a
successful product); Corcoran, supra note 242, at 136-37 (describing new research
structure at AT&T requiring research groups to work with product groups in order
to shorten development time); Markoff, supra note 242, at Al (discussing shift in
corporate research from basic research to applied technology).
251. See generally Cohen & Noll, supra note 239, at 75 (noting that companies
generally obtain greater economic value from improvements in products, rather
than from advances in fundamental knowledge); Koshland, supra note 249, at 291
(stating that applied technology results in greater probability of success and shorter development times).
252. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 195.
253. See, e.g., Whittaker & Walker, supra note 216, at 257-58 (describing the increasing tendency of pharmaceutical companies to seek novel and innovative ideas
from outside sources).
254. Id. at 250.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 257. Additionally, collaborative research serves to decrease the finan-
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olution"2 5 s of the early 1980s, these joint programs have become

an important source of innovation for pharmaceutical companies
and will likely remain an important aspect of drug development
for years to come.25 s
Patent protection forms a crucial aspect of these joint research programs as it motivates investment into research by providing the best opportunity for a return on capital." ° In fact,
the number of patent applications emanating from joint research
serves as an indicator of the success of the collaborations. 6 1 Yet,
in the rush to protect research investment, corporations and their
research partners will likely seek patent protection earlier in the
development process.262 In other words, parties may obtain patent protection for a technology that is not yet sufficiently
"ripe."263 A patent obtained under such circumstances is vulnerable if litigation later arises, especially in light of uncertain patent laws.264 Since conception operates as the cornerstone of
the inventive process, it is crucial that a conception exist in a

cial risk involved in developing a novel therapeutic agent. Id.
258. See generally, GENE DREAMS, supra note 210, at 8. GENE DREAMS provides a
comprehensive history of the biotechnology "revolution," focusing primarily on the
industry's growth as an important aspect of the United States financial markets.
259. Whittaker & Walker, supra note 216, at 258.
260. Nelsen, supra note 244, at 25. Secrecy provides protection for research organizations either in the form of state trade secret law or actual secrecy.
Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 190. Trade secrecy allows tort recovery against persons who breached a duty of confidentiality or who misappropriated information.
Id. However, protection may not extend to ongoing research projects which have
not yet resulted in commercial products or processes. Id. at 192-93. Actual secrecy
provides protection when a company closely guards confidential information. Id. Although both of these methods can be effective in some instances, they conflict with
the academic philosophy of promoting disclosure of research results. Id. at 185.
Patents do not pose this problem because the information may be disclosed and yet
still allow the patentee to retain exclusive rights to the invention. Id. at 185.
261. David Blumenthal et al., Industrial Support of University Research in Biotechnology, 231 Sci. 242, 244 (Jan. 17, 1986).
262. See, e.g., G. S. BURRILL, BIOTECH 89: COMMERCIALIZATION 67 (1989) (discussing the effects of potential patent litigation on commercial investment in biotechnology firms); see generally Nelsen, supra note 244, at 25. Nelsen states that
corporations will not usually undertake the risk of developing a new technology
without exclusive rights. Id. Moreover, the risk increases as the age of the technology decreases. Id. Thus, before agreeing to fund budding and not yet applied research, corporate sponsors will demand patent protection for the basic ideas. Id.
263. See generally Nelsen, supra note 244, at 49. Nelsen suggests that in cases of
very new discoveries, the best course may be to allow the technology to ripen before seeking patent protection. Id. In "seminal" inventions, research might continue
for two to five years before scientists realize the full commercial potential of the
invention. Id. at 45.
264. While a patent holds a presumption of validity, a court can render it invalid
with a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the invention did not warrant patent protection. See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).

1995]

The Determinationof Conception in Patent Law

definite and permanent form before an inventor seeks patent
protection." 5 While an idea may appear definite and permanent
enough for the PTO to grant a patent, the intensive examination
of the facts provided by litigation may show that conception was
not actually complete at the time claimed.266 Thus, a premature
attempt to patent an invention may cause companies to lose valuable patent protection if the patent later falls in litigation due to a
failure to show complete conception at the time claimed.267
Moreover, increased emphasis on collaborative efforts directed toward the commercial development of novel, but not yet applied, technology will likely result in a greater number of cases in
which researchers contest inventorship. That is, the parties participating in joint research may claim ownership of the invention
separately and in conflict with one another.6 6 Since conception
operates as a threshold issue in invention, the courts will, out of
necessity, increasingly address this issue in patent litigation.
Moreover, much of the work flowing from industry research collaborations involves experimental-based disciplines, such as
pharmaceuticals or biotechnology.2 69 Consequently, the federal
courts will need to address more frequently the issue of conception
in inventions resulting from experiment.2 7
265. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for conception under the Mergenthaler standard.
266. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). Section 102(g) is commonly used in patent interference proceedings to prove a date of conception prior to another patent applicant. See, e.g., Price v. Symsek, 98 F.2d 1187, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (vacating and
remanding Board of Patent Appeals decision awarding priority of invention to
senior party in interference). However, the section can also be used by a party
seeking to invalidate an issued patent by showing that the patent holder failed to
conceive the invention as claimed. See New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry
Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
267. See, e.g., New Idea, 916 F.2d at 1566 (upholding a district court decision
invalidating a patent in an infringement case because the defendant showed prior
conception of the patented invention by a third party).
268. See generally Katherine L. Chapman, IntellectualProperty Policies,Research
Agreements, Consulting Agreements, and Conflicts of Interest, in UNDERSTANDING
BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: PROTECTION, LICENSING, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES, supra note 244, at 333-36. Of course, research partners can and should formally develop agreements directed to allocating the intellectual property rights of
inventions emanating from joint research before commencing research. Id. at 31011. However, parties may disagree one the meanings of the prior agreements, especially if commercial improvements to the invention took place after the termination
of the joint research project. Id. at 334-35.
269. See generally Thomas Bulliet, Jr., Public Private Partnershipsin Biomedical
Research: Resolving Conflicts of Interest Arising Under the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 2 (1989-1990) (stating that corporations
forming cooperative ventures with government laboratories to perform biomedical
and biotechnology research); Korn, supra note 221, at 191-92 (stating that corporations are increasingly forming agreements with academic scientists to perform
biotechnology research).
270. See generally Chapman, supra note 268, at 334 (recommending that re-
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IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF CONCEPTION AND A
RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE

This Section examines the current state of the law of conception. This Section also addresses the failure of the Mergenthaler
standard to adequately accommodate the special concerns of inventions resulting from empirical methodology, such as pharmaceutical invention. Lastly, this Section suggests that the doctrine
of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice better addresses the nature of invention in the experimental sciences and
that the Federal Circuit should extend the doctrine to cases of
pharmaceutical invention.
A. Current State of the Law of Conception
As the law stands currently, federal courts must apply the
Mergenthaler standard of conception in almost all cases of invention. While the Federal Circuit has carved a limited exception in
the case of invention of a new biotherapeutic gene sequence,27 '
the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice
does not exist currently as a viable alternative to the
Mergenthaler standard of conception. Moreover, with the Federal
Circuit's recent decision in Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.272 not to extend the doctrine to the invention of a

new use for a known pharmaceutical compound, it does not appear that the doctrine will soon experience a revitalization.
Thus, under current law, federal courts must generally apply
the Mergenthalerstandard to determine conception in pharmaceutical invention. 7 ' As a result, courts view conception of a therapeutic compound as definite and permanent at the time when the
inventor possessed an idea of the potential effectiveness of the
compound.27 4 That is, if the inventor can show that reduction to
practice resulted as expected and without undue experimentation
of a complex nature, a court will fix the date of conception at the
time at which the inventor formulated a belief that the compound
would work as intended. 5 Under such circumstances, reduction
to practice serves a corroborative function, confirming that the

search agreements clearly state the rights of parties to patents emanating from
joint research to avoid disputes over which party is entitled to inventions).
271. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
272. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
1994). See supra notes 166-90 for a discussion of the Burroughs case.
273. See Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1232.
274. See id. at 1230-31; see also Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1387
(C.C.P.A. 1974). See supra notes 139-46 for a discussion of Rey-Bellet.
275. See Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1230-31.
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27 s
idea did, in fact, exist in definite and permanent form.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit does not require that the belief be
"reasonable"; on the contrary, an inventor is only required to show
another person of skill in the art would understand the idea as
represented.2 77
Fixing the date of conception as that time when the inventor
believed the invention would work as intended can have a profound effect on the outcome of priority contests involving pharmaceutical invention.278 Since the date of claimed conception will
only be negated if subsequent reduction to practice required more
than routine testing to show the feasibility of an idea, any invention of a new therapeutic compound will be fixed at the time when
the inventor recognizes the potential effectiveness of the compound.279 In determining whether testing is routine, courts generally examine whether the party reducing the idea to practice
needed to solve problems specifically addressing the invention at
issue. 2s If not, the courts find that the idea existed in definite
and permanent form to the satisfaction of the Mergenthaler standard prior to reduction to practice.2 1 Since researchers generally have standard screening methods in place to test biological
activity of compounds, new methods are rarely developed to test a
specific compound.28 2 As a result, a court will rarely find that
the work required to reduce an idea to practice negated a prior
claim of possession of a definite and permanent idea."3 Thus, in
priority contests, a court will almost certainly award inventorship
to the party who shows the earlier date of formulation of the
idea.2 4
Moreover, application of Mergenthaler to the invention of a
pharmaceutical compound can effect the outcome of originality
contests. In cases where two parties claim an invention emerging
from joint research, any work performed in the reduction to
practice inures to the benefit of the conceiving party."' Any in-

276.
277.
278.
279.
notes

Id. at 1229-30.
Id. at 1228.
See supra note 125 for a definition of a priority case.
Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1974). See supra
139-46 for a discussion of Rey.Bellet.

280. See Rey.Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1387. The Rey-Bellet court considered testing
routine if utilized as a standard procedure in the discipline.
281. See id.; see also-GAF v. Amchem, 514 F. Supp. 943, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
282. See PROFITS OF SCIENCE, supra note 196, at 165.
283. See Rey-Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1387; see also GAF, 514 F. Supp. at 968.
284. See Rey-Bellet, 493 F.2d at 1387; see also GAF, 514 F. Supp. at 968.
285. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 803-04 (S.D.
Tex.), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722
F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); Applegate, 332 F.2d at
573.
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ventive skill exercised by a second party during the reduction to
practice is essentially negated by fixing the date of conception as
equivalent to that of formulation of the idea."' Thus, courts will
classify a party who participates only in the reduction to practice
as a mere technician and not as a co-inventor. 2 7
1. Failureof the Mergenthaler Standard to Address Conception in
Experimental-Science Based Invention
Application of the Mergenthaler standard to pharmaceutical
invention, as well as chemical invention, ignores the fact that
ideas in these disciplines always contain an element of uncertainty.288 In such cases, a researcher does not definitively know that

an idea works as intended until the completion of successful reduction to practice. 9 Therefore, the type of testing performed is
irrelevant; in experimental-based invention an idea cannot exist
in definite and permanent form until the inventor reduces the
invention to practice.29 0
An examination of cases applying the Mergenthaler standard
to pharmaceutical and chemical inventions shows a common pattern. Courts applying the standard to these inventions consistently equate the existence of a definite and permanent plan for research with a definite and permanent idea required for conception
under the Mergenthaler standard. 1 The distinction is subtle,
but fundamental; the clear policy of patent law requires the disclosure of a complete and operative invention, not merely research
286. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988). Section 116 requires the naming as joint inventors of all parties participating in the conception of the invention. Id. This provision expressly states that a party need not participate in all aspects of the conception. Id.
287. Of course, not all reduction to practice involves inventive skill. Hobbs v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n., 451 F.2d 849, 865 (5th Cir. 1971). An inventor is entitled to use the services of a second party in reducing an idea to practice. Id. However, a party who performs activities "embracing the substance of all
that is embodied in the patent subsequently issued" contributes to the conception
of the invention and is properly named as joint inventor. Id.
288. See supra notes 192.210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inherent differences between experimental science-based and engineering-related
research.
289. See Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Smith v. Bousquet,
111 F.2d 157, 162-63 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
290. See, e.g., Alpert, 305 F.2d at 894 (holding that conception of a new chemical
method not complete if six months of research required to reduce the idea to practice); Smith, 111 F.2d at 162-63 (ruling that conception of a pesticide not complete
until successful reduction to practice).
291. See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 803-04 (S.D.
Tex.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722
F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); GAF v. Amchem, 514
F. Supp. 943, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1387
(C.C.P.A. 1974); Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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plans.292 Thus, application of the Mergenthaler standard to
pharmaceutical invention not only fails to address the different
nature of the inventive process, but also fails to effectuate the policy of patent law.
2. The Doctrine of Simultaneous Conception and Reduction as a
Better Standard of Conception in Experimental-BasedSciences
The doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice is better suited to address the empirical nature of experimental-based invention. This doctrine views conception as complete only when the inventor shows that reduction to practice
proved that the hoped-for result actually followed from the
idea. 2 Moreover, the doctrine does not arbitrarily classify reduction to practice on the basis of complexity, but instead, considers it as an essential aspect of conception.'
As such, application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice assures that an inventor obtains patent protection only
for those ideas that are certain to work as claimed.295
The Federal Circuit recently expressed the view that invention of a gene sequence with claimed biological activity requires
application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.296 Nonetheless, in the recent Burroughs decision, the Federal Circuit refused to extend the doctrine to the
invention of a new use for a known compound.29 Such a distinction makes little sense in light of the fact that in either case the
idea remains speculative until reduction to practice shows that
the invention works as intended. That is, whether or not the inventor knows the structure of a compound, the invention of a
therapeutic use for which a party seeks patent protection does not
definitively exist until the inventor knows with certainty that the
invention will result from reduction to practice.29

292. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
293. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169; see also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v.
Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991); Alpert, 305 F.2d at 894; Smith, 111 F.2d at 16263.
294. See Alpert, 305 F.2d at 894; Smith, 111 F.2d at 162-63; see also 1 ROBINSON,

supra note 100, at 381.
295. See, e.g., Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 (stating that an inventor may not claim
conception of a gene sequence by describing its "hoped-for" activity).

296. Id.; Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
297. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1994).

298. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 (expressing the view conception not complete
when an inventor by defines an invention by its "hoped-for function"); see also
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (stating that conception not complete when an inventor
defines a compound by its principal biological property).
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The need for application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice becomes more urgent in light of
increasing collaborations between university or government scientists with corporations.299 Very frequently, these joint projects
involve biomedical technology. 00 If the court incorrectly equates
a research proposal with complete conception by applying the
Mergenthaler standard, a corporation may acquire the sole rights
to an invention that properly belongs to both research partners. 0 1 Since a patent gives the holder exclusive rights to the
invention, the public may be denied ready access to the invention.0 2 Moreover, if the United States government subsidizes
the research by funding the academic or government laboratory
aspect of the joint project, the public may end up paying for the
invention twice: once for the research, and a second time by paying a higher price for a patented product. 0 3

299. See supra notes 239-70 for a discussion of the changing nature of American
research.
300. See generally Bulliet, supra note 269, at 2 (stating that corporations are
forming cooperative ventures with government laboratories to perform biomedical
and biotechnology research); Korn, supra note 221, at 227-28 n.213 (describing
several research agreements between universities and pharmaceutical companies).
301. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988).
302. See William L. LaFuze & Peter Mims, Ownership of Laboratory Discoveries
and Work Product,in UNDERSTANDING BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: PROTECTION, LICENSING, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES, supra note 224, at 223. Joint inven-

tors hold an undivided interest in a patent emanating from collaborative research.
Id. As such, any owner may exercise the patent rights to the invention without
consent or a requirement of accounting by the other owner(s). Id. The standard
practice of university researchers is to provide free exchange of knowledge with
colleagues and the public. Id. at 225. Thus, it follows that a university will be more
inclined to provide the public with easy access to a beneficial new technology. Research flowing out of government laboratory collaborations are governed by a complex statutory scheme that is beyond the scope of this Note. For a detailed discussion of the property rights in these collaborations, see Lacy et al., supra note 241,
passim. However, government laboratories have traditionally made patents available for use by the whole population. Id. at 4.
303. See PHARMACEUTICAL R & D, supra note 15 at 235. The patent protection
afforded to AZT has been criticized in this manner. Jonathan L. Mezrich, The Pat.
entability and Patent Term Extension of Deadly Lifesaving Drugs: A Deadly Mistake, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Socy 77, 83-84 (1992). Government scientists
originally developed AZT as a therapy for cancer in 1964 but it proved too toxic for
that use. Ackiron, supra note 3, at 166. The United States government directly
assisted BW in developing AZT as an effective therapy for HIV and AIDS. Id. at
83. BW was initially reticent to develop a large-scale project with the small number of AIDS sufferers that existed in 1985, the government afforded orphan drug
status to AZT to spur BW's research. Id. at 167. This gave BW a seven-year exclusive license to sell the drug. Id. However, the patents granted in 1988 supplanted the importance of the exclusive license. Id. Today, the market for AZT has increased proportionate to the increase in the number of persons suffering from
AIDS and HIV. Id. The United States government purchases a large amount of
AZT from BW because many persons afflicted with HIV and AIDS are uninsured
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CONCLUSION

Application of the Mergenthaler standard of conception to
inventions based on experimental observation, such as chemical
and pharmaceutical inventions, allows an inventor to obtain patent protection before fully possessing knowledge that the invention will work as intended. Such a view ignores the inherent differences between invention in the engineering-related sciences
and that in the more empirically based disciplines."' While the
fundamental differences between engineering and the experimental sciences are well-recognized outside of patent law, the courts
continue to adhere to a standard of conception that has changed
little for almost 100 years. Instead, the federal courts should acknowledge that invention in the pharmaceutical and chemical
sciences requires application of the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice to determine accurately the date
and circumstances of conception in these disciplines. The need for
courts to apply the doctrine to invention in the pharmaceutical
and chemical sciences is all the more urgent because the current
trend toward research collaborations between corporations and
other organizations will likely increase the incidence of litigation
involving empirically based inventions."0 5
It is important to keep in mind that the United States patent
system exists to effectuate the public's access to beneficial technology."' The granting of patent rights to an inventor is but a
means to this important end; it provides an inducement to motivate research that will lead to improvements useful to all of
society.307 Under the scheme of the patent system, the rewarding of inventors by granting them patent protection is subordinate
to this primary goal. 0 8 However, application of the
Mergenthaler standard of conception to cases of pharmaceutical
and chemical invention can result in the inventor's reward of
patent protection being elevated above the right of the public to
obtain free and open access to ideas. Any aspect of the law that
restricts the public's rightful access to beneficial technology violates the central purpose of the United States patent system and
cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. 0 9 Therefore,
courts should discard the narrow view that a "one size fits all"

and thus covered under the Medicare program. Id. at 168-69.
304. See aupra notes 192-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences between engineering-related and empirically-based invention.
305. See supra note 239-70 for a discussion of the changing nature of American
research.
306. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
307. See id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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standard of conception satisfactorily addresses the inventive process in all the disciplines for which inventors seek patent protection. Courts should therefore begin to apply the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice as a general rule to
invention in the pharmaceutical and chemical sciences.
Jackie Hutter,M.S.

